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Notes
COMITY BY THE FEDERAL COURTS TO STATE STATUTORY RECEiVERSiiIPS OF
DEFAULTING MUNICIPALITIES
RECOGNIZING that the only remedy of any practical utility to bondholders of de-
faulting municipalities is mandamus to compel payment either from funds on hand
or through the levy of a tax,1 the federal courts have long applied that remedy rigor-
ously in enforcement of federal judgments on defaulted municipal securities.2  Thus,
it has been no defense to the issuance of mandamus by the federal courts that the
city is under a heavy debt burden,3 that immediate payment would embarrass the
administration of its finances, 4 that the city has other creditors who ought to be en-
titled to share in the proceeds of the tax levy. A recent case, however, opens up
the possibility of widespread use of municipal receivership devices by the states to
supplant the ordinary course of judicial enforcement of defaulted municipal obliga-
tions.
A non-resident bondholders' protective committee had obtained judgment in the
Federal District Court for New Jersey against the City of Asbury Park, New Jersey,
on defaulted general obligations,6 and, in enforcement of the judgment, secured in
that court a writ of mandamus ordering the tax officers of the city to levy a' tax,
making possible the gradual payment of the claim over a period of ten years.1 On
appeal by the city, the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, relying upon
a "sound judicial discretion," vacated the order as an interference with the efforts
of the embarrassed municipality (good faith being assumed) to effect equality of
treatment of all its bondholders. It directed the court below, however, to retain
jurisdiction for the present.8 In effect, the court deferred to the intervention in the
city's financial affairs by the State of New Jersey under a recently enacted statute9
which attempts to set up a form of municipal receivership for insolvent New Jersey
municipalities.' 0 The statute provides that, on petition of the defaulting municipality
1. Rees v. City of Watertown, 86 U. S. 107 (1873); Thompson v. Allen County, 115
U. S. 550 (1885). See Comment (1934) 43 YALE L. J. 924, 962. For a comprehensive
treatment of the problems of administration of municipal credit, see id. at 924-1006.
2. 2 DILLON, Musicr'AL CoRoRAnoNs (5th ed. 1911) § 886 (the federal courts have
been the bulwark of municipal credit).
3. City of Galena v. Amy, 72 U. S. 705 (1866).
4. City of Little Rock v. United States ex rel. Howard, 103 Fed. 418 (C. C. A. 8th.
1900) ; see Rees v. Watertown, 86 U. S. 107, 116 (1873).
5. City of Galena v. Amy, 72 U. S. 705 (1866); Mayor of New Orleans v. United States
ex rel. Stewart, 49 Fed. 40 (C. C. A. 5th, 1891).
6. Christmas v. City of Asbury Park, 10 F. Supp.'22 (D. N. J., 1935).
7. For the unreported decision of the Federal District Court on the petition for mandamus
Feb. 21, 1925, see Transcript of Record 85, City of Asbury Park v. Christmas, 78 F. (2d)
1003 (C. C. A. 3d, 1935).
8. City of Asbury Park v. Christmas, 78 F. (2d) 1003 (C. C. A. 3d, 1935), cert. denied,
Oct. 21, 1935, U. S. L. WEEx, Oct. 22, 1935, at 109.
9. N. J. STAT. SERv. 1931-1935 ANN., *136-4700 (101) et seq. On March 7, 1935, the
Commission was authorized to function in Asbury Park. Transcript of Record 52, City of
Asbury Park v. Christmas, 78 F. (2d) 1003 (C. C. A. 3d, 1935).
10. For a description of the usual incidents of the clash between creditors and insolvent
municipalities in the absence of state or federal intervention-a clash often resembling
or its creditors, the New Jersey Supreme Court may authorize the Municipal Finance
Commission, created by the statute, to enter upon its duties in the municipality as
agent of the state.1 Thereafter, the Commission may determine the maximum
permissible amounts of items in any annual budget or tax ordinance of the municipal-
ity,' 2 provide for the impounding of taxes in excess of reasonable running expenses
and approved capital expenditures,13 direct that tax proceeds be applied ratably to
the purposes of the levy,' 4 and authorize the funding or refunding of indebtedness.15
During the period of its supervision, its auditor's signature is required to validate
any payments of municipal funds,' 0 and there is an automatic stay of all execution
against, or proceedings to compel the levy of taxes by, the municipality, except such
actions as are permitted by the New Jersey Supreme Court upon petition thereto,
or as are brought by the Commission.17 The state Supreme Court may also approve
a plan of adjustment or composition, which is binding on all creditors if approved by
85% in amount thereof.' s
While the statute provides for a type of state receivership of insolvent municipali-
ties, it nevertheless appears to have been the product of compromise with interests
insistent on a maximum of municipal home rule.' 0 As a result, it seems to lack some
elements of the analogous equity receivership which are equally essential to the success
of any plan of municipal reorganization. Thus, the Commission is unable affrma-
tively to direct expenditures and municipal policy, or control personnelY0  Also,
there is inadequate provision for financing the work of the Commission itself.21 And
the act has thus far apparently failed in actual operation to secure active effort by
either the Commission or the municipality in behalf of creditors.22 Nevertheless, in
addition to affording a fairly reliable source of information to creditors on the status
of municipal finances, as well as affording negative limitations on city expenditures
and a general check on the major causes of municipal default, the statute, by its pro-
visions for stay of all proceedings except those permitted by the state Supreme Court
to be brought for the benefit of all creditors, appears to provide a more or less com-
common law trial by battle-see Dimock, Legal Problems of Financially Embarrassed Muri-
cipalities (1935) 22 VA. L. Rzv. 39, 41 (general futility of this type of litigation).
11. N. J. SrAT. SEav. 1933 Azm. *136-4700 (103), (101).
12. N. J. STAT. SERv. 1935 AxN. *136-4700 (356).
13. N. J. STAT. Ssxv. 1932 AaNe. *136-4700 (353).
14. N. J. STAT. SERv. 1935 AvN. *136-4700 (359).
15. Id. § 201.
16. N. J. STAT. Stov. 1933 A.xix. *136-4700 (302-a).
17. Id. §§ 351, 352. 18. Id. §§ 407-409.
19. See Stason, State Administrative Supervision of Munidpal Indebtedness (1932) 30
MrcH. L. Rxv. 833, 849-850. However, the powers of the Commission have been considerably
enlarged by amendments and supplements since the passage of the original act in 1931,
especially by P. L. 1935, cc. 225, 292.
20. The Commission may, however, point out non-performance of official duties for
which the city may remove or suspend an official. N. J. STAT. Smnv. 1935 A... *136-47C0
(357).
21. See Proceedings Before the Securities and Exchange Commidssion in Ihe Matter of
Asbury Park, pp. 545, 553 (Washington, D. C., Oct. 28, 1935).
22. Id. at 559-560 (no payments on debt service for defaulted bonds had bee authorized
to Oct. 28, 1935, in twelve New Jersey municipalities taken over by the Commi-son at
various times since June 3, 1931, largely because the municipalities have made no move in
the matter). But cf. note 35, infra.
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plete machinery for effecting equality of treatment of creditors in a municipal in-
solvency.23
Several legal objections, however, may be available to creditors who urge that,
despite the state statute, the Circuit Court of Appeals should not have stayed the
federal mandamus process. Thus, it is arguable that, under the statute in ques-
tion, the state is assuming bankruptcy jurisdiction in violation of the exclusive juris-
diction of Congress 24 as exercised under the Federal Municipal Bankruptcy Act. "
The federal act, however, itself contemplates state supervision in the premises.
2 0
And even if Congress did intend to preempt the field of municipal bankruptcy, there
is some doubt as to its power to carry out the plan without the consent of the states,2 7
if, indeed, even then.28 It may be further contended by creditors that the act effects
an unconstitutional impairment of the obligation of contracts, not only by so bur-
dening the bondholder's remedy with conditions and restrictions as to make it hardly
worth pursuing, but, even if it be pursued, by so changing the nature of the bond-
holder's remedy as to alter his substantive rights. 20 Thus, until notice to the Com-
mission and the obtaining of special permission from the New Jersey Supreme Court
thereafter, all enforcement proceedings of bondholders are stayed by the statute. 80
And even if such permission be obtained, only a limited type of action brought for
the benefit of all creditors is allowed, 3' despite the fact that the law under which the
bonds were issued permitted bondholders to proceed individually for payment.
8 2
Furthermore, this impairment of the bondholder's rights might be difficult to justify
under the "emergency doctrine" on which the statute purports to rest. 8 For the
"emergency" contemplated by the statute is limited in time only by the duration of
23. For a general discussion of the comparative essentials of the municipal and the equity
receivership, see Dimock, Legal Problems of Financially Embarrassed Municipalities (1935)
22 VA. L. REv. 39, 43-55.
24. International Shoe Co. v. Pinkus, 278 U. S. 261 (1929).
25. 48 STAT. 798 §§ 78-80, 11 U. S. C. A. §§ 301-303 (1934).
26. 48 STAT. 798 § 80 (k), 11 U. S. C A. § 303 (k) (1934).
27. In re Cameron County Water Improvement Dist. No. 1, 9 F. Supp. 103 (S. D.
Texas, 1934). Cf. In re East Contra Costa Irr. Dist., 10 F. Supp. 175 (N. D. Cal., 1935);
In re Imperial Irr. Dist., 10 F. Supp. 832 (S. D. Cal., 1935).
28. Opinion of Special Assistant Attorney General Charles Weston, issued April 21, 1933
(reported in part in 1 C. C. H. Bankruptcy Law Service, par. 2803, pp. 957, 962).
29. Siebert v. Lewis, 122 U. S. 284 (1886) (embarrassing and delaying creditors); City
of Cleveland, Tenn. v. United States, 166 Fed. 677 (C. C. A. 6th, 1909) (substitution of
more burdensome remedy).
30. N. J. STAT. SEarv. 1933 AN. *136-4700 (351), (252).
31. Cf. State ex rel. Buckwalter v. City of Lakeland, 112 Fla. 200, 150 So. 508 (1933)
(holding invalid a Florida statute, limiting use of mandamus to payment of bondholder's
pro rata share of funds on hand, as curtailing power of court and impairing obligation of
bond contract).
32. See N. 3. ExEcuTIoNs AcT, 2 N. J. COM. STAT. (1910) 2255 § 34 (P. L. 1878, p. 182);
City of Rahway v. State ex rel. Munday, 44 N. J. Law 395, 414 (1882). But cf. Vanderpoel
v. Borough of Mt. Ephriam, 111 N. J. Law 423, 425, 168 At]. 575 (1933).
Even if the statute does deprive creditors of the right to proceed individually, this may
not be an unconstitutional impairment when the preference formerly obtainable thereby was
precarious at best, and valueless if other creditors secured similar relief, making the tax levy
so high as to be impossible of collection. See Pittsburg Steel Co. v. Baltimore Equitable
Society, 226 U. S. 455, 459 (1913).
33. Hourigan v. North Bergen Township, 113 N. J. Law 143, 172 Atl. 193 (1934), relying
on Home Building & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U. S. 398 (1934). See concurring opinion
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municipal default and is predicated, not upon widespread public distress, but merely
upon inability to pay, which might be the result of poor management, corruption, or
similar local conditions hardly justifying the abridgment of the creditor's rigbts.ns
As an additional point in support of the argument that the statute works an impair-
ment of the obligation of contracts and should therefore not be conformed to by
the federal court, it may be suggested that the halters placed by the statute on the
bondholder's remedy, and the lack of adequate provision both for financing the Com-
mission's work and for a complete enough control by the Commission over the city's
finances to assure creditors that the ills which caused the city's insolvency will be
cured, indicate that the act is purely dilatory in purpose and that it is so susceptible
of abuse as to evidence bad faith on the part of the state.Ps The limitations placed
on the bondholder's remedy, however, may be justified, not only as an effort of
the state to relieve municipal distress by doing for its municipalities what the federal
government has already done for private debtors30 and begun to do for municipal
debtors,37 but also as merely attempting in a more adequate manner to effect equality
of treatment as between municipal creditors, which the federal courts had themselves
already begun to effect by various judge-made limitations placed on the remedy of
mandamus.38 And while the "emergency" contemplated by the statute may seem
dangerously unqualified, and the statute may indicate possibilities of abuse and bad
faith, creditors of the city might well be held incompetent to raise such objections
until, having tried the statutory remedy or being otherwise able to demonstrate its
inadequacy in practice, they may, by a showing of abuse in the operation of the
statute, overcome the presumption of good faith on the part of the state and its offi-
cers.39 The fact that the highest court of the state has held the statute a legitimate
exercise of the state's police power under both state and federal constitutions adds
additional weight to the latter argument. 40
in the Hourigan case, supra, 113 N. J. Law at 152, 172 Ad. at 785 (no impairment, but
only a valid modification of remedy).
34. The act may be invoked by bondholders after 60 days' default in payment of principal
or interest on bonds, or by the municipality on a showing of inability to meet its obligations
when due. N. J. STAT. SERv. 1933 Anv. *136-4700 (101), (103). For recent limitation of
the emergency doctrine, see Worthen Co. v. Thomas, 292 U. S. 426 (1934) (relief sought to
be afforded was neither temporary nor conditional); Worthen Co. v. Kavanaugh, 295
U. S. 56 (1935).
35. See notes 21 and 22, supra. But that the state intends in good faith to preserve the
rights of creditors under the statute may be indicated by the recent refusal of the New
Jersey Supreme Court to dismiss mandamus proceedings to compel the City of Asbury Park
to appropriate $700,000 for debt service in its annual budget, under a proposed plan for
retirement of the City's bonded debt of about $11,000,000 in 40 years by smilar annual
appropriations. Whether the mandamus was instituted by bondholders or by the CommL--Ion
does not appear. See N. Y. Times, Jan. 19, 1936, § 3 at 7, col. 3.
36. B~mmuprcy Act, 30 STAT. 549 § 12 (1898), 11 U. S. C. A. § 30 (1926) (Compositions);
47 STAT. 1467 § 74, 11 U. S. C. A. § 202 (1933) (Compositions and extensions); 47 Snix.
1474 § 77, 11 U. S. C. A. § 205 (1933); 48 STAT. 912 § 77B, 11 U. S. C. A. § 207 (1934).
37. 48 STAT. 798 § 80, 11 U. S. C. A. § 303 (1934).
38. See cases cited in notes 51 and 52, infra, as to spreading payments through tax levies
over a number of years, and prorating funds on hand among all claims in the same class.
39. See Pennsylvania v. Williams, 294 U. S. 176, 183 (1935); Gordon v. Washington,
295 U. S. 30, 39 (1935) (federal court should not appoint receiver to displace state officer
in possession "except where it appears that the procedure afforded by state law is inadequate
or that it will not be diligently and honestly followed").
40. Hourigan v. North Bergen Township, 113 N. II. Law 143, 172 Ad. 193 (1934).
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But even if the statute on its face works no unconstitutional impairment of credi-
tors' rights, and although it is possible that the statutory procedure will generally be
used by the municipalities in good faith, the question remains whether the federal
court should exercise a jurisdiction properly and seasonably invoked or should, instead,
remit creditors to their remedy under the statute in the state courts. First, as to its
power to do either, although state statutes prescribing generally applicable methods
for enforcement of judgments may be binding upon federal courts,41 they cannot annul
or abridge the jurisdiction of the latter by confining actions to the state courts, 42 or, as
in the instant case, by prescribing the qualifications of suitors 42 or prohibiting the
granting of mandamus in special cases. 43 But may the court, although not bound by
the state statute, nevertheless refuse the relief sought by judgment creditors of the
municipality, and thus conform to the state statute? Since mandamus in the lower
federal courts is purely ancillary to the judment which gives jurisdiction 45 and which,
in such a case as the present one, renders res adjudicata all issues as to the validity
and amount of the bonds sued upon,40 the writ in effect is the method of execution on
the judgment against a municipality.47 To that extent, mandamus may be considered a
writ of right, subject only to certain well-established principles within which judicial
discretion must be confined. 48 And efforts of a municipality to effect equal treatment
of creditors have not generally been considered sufficient reason for withholding en-
forcement by mandamus. 49 But while this has previously been true, it does not neces-
sarily indicate that the federal court lacks discretion to withhold or modify man-
damus process in deference to the state statute or for reasons of equity, nor that it
should not do so, in view of the limitations inherent in its own process in effecting an
equitable arrangement between creditors inter sese and the municipality. 0° Thus,
although the general rule has been rigorous use of mandamus in enforcement of judg-
41. U. S. Rv. STAT. § 916 (1872), 28 U. S. C. A. § 727 (1926); Custer v. McCutcheon,
283 U. S. 514 (1931); Warren, Federal Process and State Legislation (1930) 16 VA, L. REV.
421, 546.
42. Cowles v. Mercer County, 74 U. S. 118 (1868); Railway Co. v. Whitton's Adm'r.,
80 U. S. 270 (1871); cf. Lappe v. Wilcox 14 F. (2d) 861 (N. D. N. Y. 1926). The New
Jersey statute involved in the instant case permits mandamus only upon petition to the
New Jersey Supreme Court. N. J. STAT. SERv. 1933 AqN. *136-4700 (352).
43. David Lupton's Sons Co. v. Automobile Club of America, 225 U. S. 489 (1912). In
the instant case the state statute, if binding, would in effect render a federal judgment in
an action brought on behalf of less than all creditors unenforceable, as such, since mandamus
is, in cases covered by the statute, available only on behalf of all creditors.
44. United States ex rel. Kilpatrick v. Capdevielle, 118 Fed. 809 (C. C. A. 5th, 1902);
see Riggs v. Johnson County, 73 U. S. 166, 195 (1867); Canal etc. Rr. Co. v. Hart, 114
U. S. 654, 661 (1885); cf. Evans v. Yost, 255 Fed. 726 (C. C. A. 8th, 1919). See Edwards
v. Kearzey, 96 U. S. 595, 601 (1877)- (invalidity of stay laws).
45. Bath County v. Amy, 80 U. S. 244 (1871); County of Greene v. Daniel, 102 U. S.
187 (1880).
46. Beloit v. Morgan, 74 U. S. 619 (1868); City of Chanute v. Trader, 132 U. S. 210
(1889).
47. See United States ex rel. Weber v. Lee County, 73 U. S. 210, 213 (1867) ; Davenport
v. County of Dodge, 105 U. S. 237, 243 (1881).
48. United States ex rel. Masslich v. Saunders, 124 Fed. 124 (C. C. A. 8th, 1903). See
fIhGrr, Exmoinnm:ARy LrEAL RE= Es (3d ed., 1896) § 4.
49. See City of Galena v. Amy, 72 U. S. 705, 709 (1866); Mayor of New Orleans v.
United States ex rel. Stewart, 49 Fed. 40, 44 (C. C. A. 5th, 1891); United States ex rel.
Dana v. Village of Kent, 107 Fed. 190 (C. C. N. D. Ohio, 1901).
50. See notes 53-55, infra, and the text relative thereto.
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ments against municipalities, this policy has under some circumstances been tempered
in the direction of easing the embarrassed municipality's burden and effecting equality
of treatment among creditors. For example, mandamus has been so issued as to
allow the municipality to spread its payments over a number of years, where the
levy of a tax is necessitated,51 and, where the city is able at least to make partial
payments out of funds on hand, to allow it to prorate payments among all creditors.=2
In fact, a possible argument against conforming to the state statute in the instant
case might be the fact that the federal courts could without substantial difficulty go
even further in the direction of moulding existing remedies to accomplish much of
what the state statute, in deference to which the court is asked to stay its process,
purports to accomplish. For, although mandamus lies to enforce only a clear legal
duty owed directly to the one seeking the writ,53 and, in the lower federal courts,
issues only in aid of an existing jurisdiction obtained through a federal judgment,4
so that federal mandamus for all creditors could issue pursuant only to a federal
judgment secured by a bondholder or bondholders holding not less than all the out-
standing bonds,54 nevertheless, the procedural obstacles to equitable use of the man-
damus remedy seem not insuperable, in view of the fact that the remedy is already
closely associated with equitable principles.55 Thus, the court could, although it issues
the mandamus for a single creditor or group of creditors, holding less than all the
bonds, condition the order in such wise that, if the municipality fails to levy and col-
lect taxes to the limit of its capacity and, over the stipulated period, to distribute the
proceeds in excess of reasonable running expenses pro rata among all creditors equally
entitled with the relator, then the entire judgment in favor of the parties to whom
mandamus was granted will be forthwith payable.5 0 Moreover, the burden of proving
performance of the condition might well be placed on the respondent municipality,
within whose peculiar knowledge the facts lie, to insure good faith and possibly avoid
the often prohibitive expense to complainant creditors of a complete survey of the
municipality's financial capacity. Where a protective committee representing a large
percentage of the creditors has obtained the writ, the municipality should be very
willing to secure the advantage of such a condition in an order of mandamus so as to
avoid exhausting its entire debt service in paying a single group of creditors.
51. East St. Louis v. Amy, 120 U. S. 600 (1887); City of Cleveland, Tenn. v. United
States, 166 Fed. 677 (C. C. A. 6th, 1909); Perry v. Town of Samson, 11 F. (2d) 655 (M. D.
Ala., 1926).
52. Jewell v. City of Superior, 135 Fed. 19 (C. C. A. 7th, 1904), cert. denied, 198 U. S.
583 (1905); Groner v. United States ex rel. Snower, 73 F. (2d) 126 (C. C. A. 8th, 1934).
See 1 JoaNs, TaE LAw or Boxas AND Bo-, SEcunrrms (4th ed. 1935) § 511 and caes cited;
Comment (1933) 21 CALU'. L. REv. 161, 163.
53. See Knox County v. Aspinwall, 65 U. S. 376, 383 (1860) ; HIoH, E.. aormAn LwmL
R xrmms (3d ed. 1896) § 10.
54. Even if the original suit on the bonds were attempted as a group action, so as to
lay a foundation for a group mandamus, a money judgment could be had only for such
bonds as were held by actual parties to the action or persons permitted to intervene.
55. See Duncan Townsite Co. v. Lane, 245 U. S. 303, 312 (1917); United States ex rel.
Arant v. Lane, 249 U. S. 367, 371 (1919).
56. Although it might be difficult to make the very issuance of this legal remedy condi-
tional, it should be possible to issue the writ ordering the payment of small annual amounts
not exceeding relator's probable pro rata share. Determination of municipal capacity to
pay would not be necessary at that time, as the court might iLsue the writ for only Aort
periods or modify the current writ as the municipality demonstrated its capacity to pay.
Periodic reports might be required for this purpose. See Carteret v. Sovereign Camp,
Woodmen of the World, 78 F. (2d) 337, 339 (C. C. A. 4th, 1935).
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But while the court is thus free to conform to the state statute or not, and seemingly
is in a position, despite procedural handicaps, to work out an equitable adjustment be-
tween creditors inter sese and between them and the municipality by a skillful use of
mandamus, the primary question remains, whether or not the federal court should for
reasons of policy defer to the operation of the state statute. There is legitimate sup-
port for an answer either way. On the one hand, it is asserted that legislation of the
type enacted by New Jersey fosters a belief on the part of municipal debtors that they
cannot be compelled to pay their obligations. As long as it appears that creditors can
secure only what the municipality is willing to pay, no fair settlement of indebtedness
can be reached.57 It must be admitted that judicial coercion may often be useful to
stimulate the exercise of the municipal taxing power and to inspire municipal cobpera-
tion toward reaching a reasonable refunding plan. Nevertheless, the municipality is a
political unit whose recalcitrancies can probably best be met by the state to which
it is answerable for abuse of powers delegated to it.58 That the federal court should
withdraw in favor of the state system rests largely on the theory that such state super-
vision of its embarrassed municipalities is analogous to state receivership of cor-
porations peculiarly belonging under its control. Thus, for example, the determination
of the extent or present availability of the municipality's taxing power as a source
of assets for distribution is essentially a legislative function involving matters of state
public policy.5 9 To the extent, therefore, that the New Jersey statute provides for
municipalities the elements of an equity receivership peculiarly suited to state admin-
istration, principles of comity may be said to require the federal court to relinquish
its jurisdiction.60 Obviously, however, any such disposition of the rights of judg-
ment creditors by the federal court must be predicated upon the exercise of good
faith by the state and its administrative agency. Accordingly, jurisdiction to deter-
mine whether or not the statute will in practice operate unduly to encumber the
remedies of creditors, thus justifying the federal court in proceeding to enforce its
usual process, has been expressly retained in the instant case.
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF TAX ON USE OF PROPERTY PURCHASED IN INTERSTATE COM-
MERCE AS COMPLEMENT TO RETAIL SALES TAX
SINCE states are prohibited under the commerce clause of the federal Constitution1
from taxing transactions in interstate commerce, considerable business has been
diverted to such commerce in an attempt to avoid state sales taxes, thereby depriving
the state of revenue and the local merchant of business.2 Congress has been urged
to remove this subsidy to interstate commerce by enacting either a federal sales tax,
57. See Transcript of Record 184-186, 170-171, City of Asbury Park v. Christmas, 78 F.
(2d) 1003 (C. C. A. 3d, 1935).
58. See Merriwether v. Garrett, 102 U. S. 472, 511 (1880); Briggs, Shall Bankruptcy
Jurisdiction be Extended to Include Municipalities and Other Taxable Subdivisions (1934)
8 J. NAT. Ass'N OF REF. IN BxpTcY. 70, 71.
59. Merriwether v. Garrett, 102 U. S. 472 (1880).
60. Pennsylvania v. Williams, 294 U. S. 176 (1935).
1. U. S. CoNsT. Art. I, § 8, clause 3.
2. See BumLER, GmNERAL SALES TAXATION (1932) 218; HAIo, TE SALES TAX IN Tun
AsmIcAx STATES (1934) 83; Johnson, State Sales Taxes and the Commerce Clause (1936)
24 CAnT. L. REbV. 155; Lowndes, State Taxation of Interstate Sales (1935) 7 Miss. L. REy.
223; Perkins, The Sales Tax and Transactions in Interstate Commerce (1933) 12 N. C. L,
REv. 99; Shoup and Haimoff, The Sales Tax (1934) 34 COL. L. Rav. 809, 826,
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the proceeds of which would be distributed among the states according to population 3
or a statute allowing the taxation of interstate sales by the state into which the
property is shipped.4 However, since the possibility of Congressional action appears
remote, several states have adopted their own devices designed to protect local
merchants from future loss of business.5 The state of Washington has passed a
so-called compensating tax as a complement to its retail sales tax. The retail sales
tax requires each vendor of tangible personal property, as agent for the tax com-
mission, to collect from the vendee a tax equal to two per cent of the purchase price
3. See 2 REsmra REPORTS Or IN-nRsATE Co anssrou o CON.I CT O TATmoN:
Heer, A State Shared Federal Sales Tax (1934). The North Carolina Sales tax provides
that should the federal government enact any form of sales tax the proceeds of which
are distributed in whole or in part to the states, the Governor and Council of State shall
estimate North Carolina's share and reduce the rate of the state tax accordingly. N. C.
CoDE, A"m. (1935) § 7880 (156)c.
4. Such a bill was passed by the United States Senate in 1934, 78 CoNo. R. 4593
(1934), but died in the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce. For a
complete discussion of all phases of such a statute including the question of its consti-
tutionality, see Hearings before Committee on Interstate Commerce on S. 2897, 73d Cong.,
2d Sess. (1934); Hearings before Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce on H. R.
8303, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934); Lowndes, supra note 2; Perkins, supra note 2. The
legislature of Indiana passed a resolution in 1935 urging Congress to pass such a statute.
Ind. Sess. Laws, 1935, c. 348.
5. The Arkansas sales tax provides that where there are adjoining towns separated by
a state line or where property is purchased in Arkansas to be used in another state, the
rate of the tax shall be the same as that imposed in the adjoining state or in the state
where the property is to be used. Ark. Acts, 1935, Act 233 § 4, subdiv. (E), § 20. This
would seem to deny the equal protection of the laws, since the place where the property
is purchased scarcely seems sufficient to justify a different rate of taxation. The result of
this statute is merely to shift the injury to business, occasioned by persons buying in
localities with a lower sales tax, from the border town merchants to those in towns slightly
removed from the state line. However, the provisions have been sustained by the Arkansas
Supreme Court, Wiseman v. Phillips, 84 S. W. (2d) 91 (Ark. 1935), on the authority of
Bollinger v. Watson, 187 Ark. 1044, 63 S. W. (2d) 642 (1933) (similar provision in gasoline
sales tax), noted in (1934) 82 U. or PA. L. REv. 281. Oklahoma attempts to impose a
license tax, measured by the gross sales to consumers in Olfahoma, on salesmen whose
merchandise is located outside the state. Okla. Sess. Laws, 1935, c. 66 art. 7, § 4, subdiv. (k).
This seems invalid as a license tax on the privilege of engaging in an interstate business.
Brennan v. Titusvlle, 153 U. S. 289 (1894); see Sonneburn Bros. v. Cureton, 262 U. S.
505, 515 (1923). Cf. Wiloil Corp. v. Pennsylvania, 294 U. S. 169 (1935) (tax on sale valid
where interstate delivery not necessary part of contract). Oklahoma also imposes a one
per cent tax on the fair market value of goods imported or brought into the state by
the consumer. Okla. Sess. Laws, 1935, c. 66, art. 7, § 4, subdiv. (j). Aside from any
question of burdening interstate commerce, this tax appears to violate the state consti-
tutional requirement that property taxes be equal and uniform. See 1 Coorsa, TA. cA roz
(4th ed. 1924) §§ 46, 252 ff.; GAvar, Tim Co?,amcn CrAvsE (1932) § 170; Comment
(1921) 35 HARv. L. REv. 70. North Carolina merely imposes a tax equal to the sales tax
on the privilege of using on the public highways automobiles which have not ben subject
to the sales tax. N. C. CODE Azzx-x. (1935) § 78S0 (156)e (13). This appears valid for
the same reasons given in the text to justify the Washington compensating tax. In addition,
the North Carolina statute does not exempt automobiles purchased previous to the date
of enactment, and thus avoids the difficulty suggested in the text with respect to the
Washington law.
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on each retail sale within the state. 6 The compensating tax attempts to reach interstate
transactions by imposing an excise tax equal to two per cent of the purchase price
on the privilege of using within the state tangible personal property purchased sub-
sequent to the effective date of the tax, the sale of which has not already been taxed,7
In a recent case, plaintiff, who had purchased a trailer and a gasoline tank from
Oregon manufacturers for use in the taxing state, sought to enjoin the collection
of the tax on the several grounds that its rate exceeded the maximum rate for property
taxes as fixed by state statute,8 that it violated the state constitutional requirement
of uniform application of property taxes,9 and that it contravened the commerce
clause of the United States Constitution by imposing a direct burden on interstate
commerce. The Washington Supreme Court by a six to three decision, however,
held that the state statutory and constitutional limitations, being placed solely on
property taxes, were inapplicable, since the instant tax is an excise tax,10 and, further,
that since the tax was imposed upon the privilege of using property within the state
after the interstate movement had ceased, the burden on interstate commerce was
at most indirect and consequently not objectionable under the United States
Constitution.1l
It is clear that the commerce clause does not prevent a state from imposing a
nondiscriminator tax on property before it enters1 2 or after it leaves the current
of interstate commerce,13 for, in such cases, it is held that the tax only indirectly
affects interstate commerce. 14 But it is conceded that, since the rate of the tax in
the instant case is two percentum and since the tax does not apply to property pur-
chased previous to the effective date of the act or already taxed under the retail
6. 9 WAsH. REv. STAT. (Remington, Supp. 1935) §§ 8370-16-8370-30, held constitutional,
Morrow v. Henneford, 47 P. (2d) 1016 (Wash. 1935).
7. 9 WAsr. REv. STAT. (Remington, Supp. 1935) §§ 8370-31-8370-35. This tax follows
the suggestions found in Lowndes, supra note 2, at 231; Perkins, supra note 2 at 107.
California has enacted practically the identical tax. Cal. Sess. Laws, 1935, c. 361. See
(1936) Legis. 24 CA w. L. RE-v. 175.
8. The aggregate amount of taxes shall not exceed forty mills of the assessed value of
the property. 11 ,Asn. REV. STAT. (Remington, Supp. 1935) § 11238-a.
9. Property taxes must be uniform upon the same class of subjects. WsU. CoNs~T.
AmEND. XIV.
10. Taxes on the use of property have been held valid excises, since the owner by not
using his property may avoid the tax. Hylton v. United States, 3 U. S. 171 (1796);
Billings v. United States, 232 U. S. 261 (1914); Bowman v. Continental Oil Co., 256 U. S.
642 (1921). Whether a tax is an excise or a property tax is purely a matter of interpreting
state statutes and constitutions. The decision of the highest state court is, therefore, con-
clusive. See 1 COOLEY, TAxAT oN (4th ed. 1924) § 46.
11. Vancouver Oil Co. v. Henneford, 49 P. (2d) 14 (Wash. 1935).
12. Coe v. Errol, 116 U. S. 517 (1886); Diamond Match Co. v. Ontonagon, 188 U. S.
82 (1903). But a tax on property while in transit in interstate commerce is prohibited,
Hays v. Pacific Mail S. S. Co., 58 U. S. 596 (1855); St. Louis v. Wiggins Ferry Co., 78
U. S. 423 (1871); Champlain Realty Co. v. Brattleboro, 260 U. S. 366 (1922); Hughes
Bros. Co. v. Minnesota, 272 U. S. 469 (1926).
13. Brown v. Houston, 114 U. S. 622 (1885); Pittsburg & Southern Coal Co. v. Bates,
156 U. S. 577 (1895) ; American Steel & Wire Co. v. Speed, 192 U. S. 500 (1904).
14. See 1 COOLEY, TAxATiON (4th ed. 1924) §§ 369 ff.; GAVIT, TuE Commecr CLAUSE
(1932) c. 13; Powell, Indirect Encroachment on Federal Authority (1918) 31 HAMV. L. REV.
721, 932, 32 HARv. L. REV. 234, 374 (1919) 634, 902 (1920); Powell, State Tax Controversies
(1928) 76 U. oF PA. L. REv. 773, 958.
sales tax, the tax in the instant case cannot be sustained as a property tax because
of the state requirements that property taxes shall not exceed forty mills on the
dollar of the assessed value of the property and that they shall be uniform on the
same class of subjects.' 5
However, it is argued by the state that the compensating tax can be sustained
as a valid excise tax to which the forty mill tax limitation and the uniformity pro-
vision are inapplicable. And arguments similar to those applicable to sustain a
property tax on tangible personalty under the commerce clause are available to
sustain, under the same clause, an excise tax on the use of the propertyj4 Thus,
it may be contended that the tax is imposed, not on the privilege of purchasing the
goods, but on the privilege of using the goods within the state after the interstate
transaction is consummated, a privilege which is local in character.10 And the tax
is collected when the taxpayer first uses or performs some act preparatory to using
the property, not when the property is purchased or paid for.17 Furthermore, tax
statutes similar to the compensating tax have been sustained. For example, it has
been held that state taxes on the privilege of storing, selling, and consuming property
do not violate the commerce clause even though part of the property subject to
the tax has been shipped in interstate commerce1 8 Likewise, state excise taxes on
the privilege of producing commodities are upheld, even though most of the property
produced is eventually shipped in interstate commerce.10
Nor, it is argued, does the instant tax discriminate against articles which have
their origin in another state.20 For it is settled that a tax which appears to dis-
criminate against property shipped from other states does not violate the commerce
clause if property already in the taxing state is subject to a similar tax.21 In the
instant case, the retail sales tax imposes a similar burden upon articles acquired
within the state to that which the compensating tax imposes upon goods acquired
in interstate commerce; and it was the express intent of the legislature that the two
tax statutes should be read together. Furthermore, practically the same argument
can be used to justify the instant tax under the equal protection clause of the Federal
Constitution for its effect is merely to equalize tax burdens between property already
taxable under the retail sales tax and property not so taxable.
15. Respondent's brief 6.
16. 9 WAsu. Rv. STAT. (Remington, Supp. 193S) § 8370-31.
17. 9 WAsu. R v. STAT. (Remington, Supp. 1935) § 8370-34.
18. Bowman v. Continental Oil Co., 256 U. S. 642 (1921) (sale and use); Sonneburn
Bros. v. Cureton, 262 U. S. 506 (1923) (sale); Gregg Dyeing Co. v. Query, 286 U. S. 472
(1932) (storage); Edelman v. Boeing Air Transport, 289 U. S. 249 (1933) (removal from
storage).
19. Oliver Iron Mining Co. v. Lord, 262 U. S. 172 (1923) (mining iron ore, most of
which was mined to fill orders in other states) ; Hope Gas Co. v. Hall, 274 U. S. 284 (1927)
(gas production); Utah Power & Light Co. v. Pfost, 286 U. S. 16S (1932) (electric power
generation).
20. The commerce clause prohibits the taxation of an intrastate privilege or occupation
where the tax works a discrimination against property shipped from another state. Welton
v. Missouri, 91 U. S. 275 (1876); Webber v. Virginia, 103 U. S. 344 (1881); Darnell &: Son
v. Memphis, 208 U. S. 113 (1908); Bethlehem Motors Co. v. Flynt, 2S6 U. S. 421 (1921);
cf. Cox v. Texas, 202 U. S. 446 (1906).
21. Gregg Dyeing Co. v. Query, 286 U. S. 472 (1932); Jerome H. Sheip Co. v. Amo_,
100 Fla. 863, 130 So. 699 (1930); cf. Hinson v. Lott, 75 U. S. 148 (1869) (tax on cale of




It is, however, arguable that the tax is not on the privilege of using property after
it is acquired in interstate commerce, but is in reality a tax on the privilege of
purchasing. Thus, the tax is measured by the price paid for the article, a measure
which might have no relation to the value of the actual use of the property. For
example, A might purchase an automobile from an out of state dealer for six hundred
dollars, and B, a few days later and after a drastic price reduction, might purchase
the same kind of automobile from the same dealer for three hundred dollars. A
would be obliged to pay a twelve dollar tax while B would pay only six dollars, yet
the actual use of the automobiles might be identical. Furthermore, since the tax is
measured by the purchase price and is imposed upon the purchaser, a donee of an
article would not be required to pay anything, even though he enjoys full use.
22
Moreover, the tax is imposed only if the property has been purchased subsequent
to the effective date of the tax. Thus property acquired prior to the effective date
of the tax, and property acquired after the date of the tax in other ways than by
purchase may be used without subjecting the user to the tax. Therefore, since
whether or not a tax will be imposed seems to depend upon whether the article
was purchased after the date of the tax and not upon whether or not the property
is used, it could be argued that the tax is in reality upon the privilege of purchase,
and therefore a tax upon interstate transactions.23
These objections, however, are perhaps not insurmountable. For, while the pur-
chase price of tangible personalty may not be an accurate measure of the value of
the use, nevertheless the measure need bear only a reasonably accurate relation to
22. The tax shall be "an amount equal to the purchase price paid by the taxpayer
multiplied by two per cent." 9 WAsH. Rxv. STAT. (Remington, Supp. 1935), § 8370-31,
It is possible that under certain conditions the donor would not be liable for the tax, even
though he is a resident of the taxing state and purchases the article in some foreign state,
Thus, although the tax commissi6n has ruled that liability for the compensating tax accrues
as soon as the purchaser uses the property or exercises any right or power over the property
preparatory to using it, such as keeping, or storing it or performing any act of dominion
over it, Prentice-Hall, State & Local Tax Service (Wash.) § 8421, not even this broad inter-
pretation could subject the donor to the tax where the property is delivered direct from
the foreign vendor to the donee. Moreover, the constitutionality of a broader interpretation
is doubtful. Cf. Billings v. United States, 232 U. S. 261 (1914) (tax may be imposed on
privilege of using foreign built yacht) with Pierce v. United States, 232 U. S. 290 (1914)
(tax may not be imposed where yacht not actually used).
23. It ig also arguable that the fadt that the taxpayer is allowed a deduction for any
tax imposed by any other state on the sale or use of the property [9 WAsr, REsV. STAT.
(Remington, Supp. 1935) §§ 8370-32, 8370-33], is further indicative that the real purpose
of the tax is not to raise revenue by taxing the use of property, but, rather, to discourage
consumers from purchasing property from out of state merchants to avoid the sales tax,
and thus to suppress competition between the states in contravention of the commerce
clause. Cf. Brimmer v. Reaman, 138 U. S. 78 (1891); Baldwin v. Seelig, 294 U. S. S11
(1935). However, even if these provisions for deduction be objectionable, they could
easifly be eliminated, leaving the rest of the statute standing, if the tax were otherwise valid.
For, inasmuch as interstate transactions are immune from sales taxation by the state from
which the property was shipped [Heyman v. Hays, 236 U. S. 178 (1915); State ex rel.
Botkin v. Welsh, 61 S. D. 593, 251 N. W. 189 (1933); see Sonneborn Bros. v. Cureton,
262 U. S. 506, 515 (1923)], the deduction provisions would be applicable only in the
comparatively rare situations where the consumer made an intrastate purchase in another
state, thus subjecting himself to that state's sales tax, and subsequently brought the property
into Washington for use.
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the value in order to survive judicial review.24 And it may be argued that, in view
of the administrative impracticability and expense of a more complicated analysis
of the use value of innumerable and diversified types of tangible personalty, and
in view of the fact that purchase price on the average represents at least the rser's
conception of the value to him of the use of the property, purchase price as a
measure of use value should be valid. Furthermore, it is arguable that the dis-
crimination between property purchased prior to the effective date of the act and
that purchased after is reasonably adapted to effective and inexpensive administration
of the tax, and therefore not necessarily indicative that the tax is really on the
purchase, that is, on the interstate transaction, and not on the privilege of use.2
For, any attempt to tax the use value, measured by purchase price, of property
purchased previous to the date of enactment might prove exceedingly awkward in
view of the probable failure of taxpayers to keep an adequate record of such
transactions prior to that date.26
Finally, the compensating use tax may be supported on the grounds that it is the
only practicable method of preventing discriminations in favor of interstate commerce
resulting from local sales taxes. For, a federal law permitting local taxation of
interstate transactions to supplement state sales taxes4 would likely prove useless if
the present compensating tax were held invalid. Even though such a partial abdi-
cation of a federal realm of power has been held valid as a method of enabling
states to combat the local consumption of articles widely considered socially injurious,
nevertheless, Congress might well be held powerless in the present situation, analogous
moral considerations being absent, to permit states to impose what had already been
held by the Court to be a direct burden upon interstate commerce.
All these considerations might be obviated by the elimination of state sales taxes
and the substitution of a federal sales tax. Not only, however, would such a plan
involve great difficulty in attempting an equitable distribution of the tax proceeds
24. The standard by which a tax shall be measured is within the discretion of the
legislature. 4 Coo=xv, TAXAnoNT (4th ed. 1924) § 1692.
25. This same argument may be used to justify the discrimination as reasonable, and
thus not violative of the equal protection clause in the Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution. Furthermore, it may be argued that the equal protection clanre
does not demand absolute equality in taxation, but merely requires that all pesons in a
class be treated alike. Bell's Gap Rr. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 134 U. S. 232 (1890) (leading
case); 1 Coo=, TAxTiroN (4th ed. 1924) § 249. The compensating tax satisfie this
requirement, since every one is taxed for the use of all property purchased subsequent to
the effective date of the tax, and no one is taxed for the use of other property.
26. Although the compensating taxes upheld by the United States Supreme Court in
the gasoline cases, supra note 18, are distinguishable from the instant tax on the ground
that in the former the tax was a fixed amount per unit (gallon) of commodity, irrespctive
of purchase price and time of purchase, nevertheless, the distinction does not justify a
different result in the instant case. For, in view of the substantial practical difference
between measuring the use-value of one commodity, particularly one with a relatively
uniform and stable price such as gasoline, and measuring the value of the innumerable
and diversified commodities whose use is sought to be taxed in the instant case, the measuring
of value by purchase prices in the latter case would not seem to indicate that the tax is
any more a tax on the foreign purchase, and therefore in violation of the commerce clause,
than the tax in the former case. And if that practical difference justifies the measure of
use-value adopted in the instant statute, it would also seem to justify the difference in
application to commodities purchased previous to enactment of the statute. For, although
it is a relatively simple matter to lay a flat tax on all gasoline in storage in a particular
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among the states, 27 but the rigidity of constitutional doctrine which would force such
a result as the only alternative to defective state sales tax systems would seem
regrettable.
RIGHT OF A DILATORY CREDITOR IN BANKRUPTCY TO SET ASIDE DIVIDEND DISTRIBUTIONS
SECTION 66(a) of the Bankruptcy Act' provides that the trustee shall pay into
court dividends which remain unclaimed six months after the final dividend has
been declared; and Section 66(b) 2 provides that, after these unclaimed dividends
have remained in court for one year, they are to be distributed, under the court's
direction to those creditors who have not been paid in full, or, to the bankrupt, if
all creditors' claims have been satisfied entirely. In accordance with this procedure,
a trustee deposited some unclaimed dividends with the clerk of the Federal District
Court for the Southern District of New York, where they remained for one year. At
the end of that period, the court, upon motion, paid over this'unclaimed surplus to
a corporation which previously had been organized by creditors for the explicit purpose
of facilitating final liquidation and distribution of the bankrupt's estate.8 Subse-
quent to this payment, the assignee of two creditors, whose claims had been duly
filed and proven, but whose dividend checks, although mailed to them by the trustee,
had nevertheless remained uncashed, sought to set aside the payment to the corpora-
tion. Although plaintiff claimed that its assignors had not received the checks and
had not otherwise been acquainted with the fact of their disbursement, so as to warn
them of the running of the period of limitations against them, the evidence showed
that the checks should have been received by plaintiff's assignors in the usual course
of business. The Circuit Court for the Second Circuit, however, held for the plain-
tiff in a two-one decision, reversing the lower court. The distribution to the cor-
porate defendant was thus set aside and the plaintiff permitted to share in the fund
on the grounds that Section 66(b) was not a statute of limitations; that the only
bar to dilatory claimants was a final distribution by the court; and that payment to
state at a particular time, nevertheless, where the tax is measured by purchase prices and
the purchase prices appertain to the host of commodities reached by the instant tax, the
exemption of commodities purchased previous to enactment of the statute seems justified
by the practical considerations mentioned in the text. The exemption is thus not necessarily
indicative that the tax is on something other than the privilege of use.
27. See 2 REsEARcH REPORTS OF INTERSTATE COMIMSSION ON CONFLICTINo TAXATION:
Heer, A State Shared Federal Sales Tax (1934).
1. 30 STAT. 564 (1898), 11 U. S. C. A. § 106(a) (1927).
2. 30 STAT. 564 (1898), 11 U. S. C. A. § 106(b) (1927). "Dividends remaining un-
claimed for one year shall, under the direction of the court, be distributed to the creditors
whose claims have been allowed but not paid in full, and after such claims have been paid
in full the balance shall be paid to the bankrupt: Provided, That in case unclaimed divi-
dends belong to minors such minors may have one year after arriving at majority to claim
such dividends."
66(b), historically, was designed to remedy a hiatus in previous bankruptcy acts. No
definite procedure formerly was enunciated for the disposal of such unclaimed funds, See
In re Blight's Estate, Fed. Cas. No. 1540 (D. Pa. 1842); In re Fielding, 96 Fed. 800 (W. D.
Mo. 1899); American Loan & Trust Co. v. Grand Rivers Co., 159Fed. 775 (W. D. Ky. 1908) ;
In re Moneys in Registry of District Court, 170 Fed. 470 (E. D. Pa. 1909); In re Orona
Mfg. Co., 269 Fed. 855 (D. Mass. 1921); GILBERT'S Coaxm, BANRupwY (3d ed, 1934)
1047.
(Val. 45
the liquidating corporation was merely payment in gross and not a final distribution.4
In those few previous cases where the time limitation of Section 66(b) has been
alluded to, dilatory claimants, who first appeared in the bankruptcy proceedings after
six months from the time of the adjudication, universally have been barred from any
participation in the surplus remaining after distribution to scheduled creditors who
have filed and proven their claims and accepted their dividends. But in each of these
cases, the claimants who sought participation in the surplus had not complied with
the provisions of Section 57(n) 5, which requires creditors to prove claims within six
months after the adjudication or else be barred from any participation in the debtor's
estate.6 Hence, the actual ratio decidendi of these decisions was the prohibition of
Section 57(n), rather than a determination that Section 66(b), in and of itself, was
a bar to claimants who first asserted their rights after the year and a half period
following the final declaration of dividends.
Consequently, since, in the instant case, the claimants had complied with the
provisions of Section 57(n), the court could approach the issue of whether 66(b)
was a statute of limitations unembarrassed by previous holdings or by the effect of
the absolute bar of 57(n). As pointed out by the court, Section 66(b) fails to specify
any person or persons upon whose motion the distribution of the surplus fund may be
made by the court at the end of the year of deposit in the court. Because of the
inertia of the court and the substantial clerical work involved in making such a dis-
tribution, it is probable that, rather than direct the distribution of its own volition,
the court will prefer to wait until some creditor moves for a distribution. Until that
distribution actually is made and the position of other creditors and the court thus
substantially changed, no reason appears why a creditor whose claim has been proven,
but who has been dilatory in collecting, should be subjected to the disproportionate
penalty of forfeiture of his share. Hence, it would seem that the bar implied from
Section 66(b), as against dilatory creditors claiming after distribution, should not
be applied until actual distribution to creditors. After that time, however, the red-
pients of shares should not be placed under the hazard of being forced to return the
distributed share to a party, who, until then, has slept on his rights. Indeed, this has
been the policy of courts in the analogous situation of bar orders in equity receiver-
ships and in creditor's suits for sequestration. Here, the time limit set by the court
for the filing and proving of claims, although phrased in strictest terms, may be ex-
tended at the instance of dilatory creditors where the fund yet remains undistributed
at the time of filing by such creditors.7 And, where claims of governmental bodies,
3. This corporation had already acquired certain unliquidated assets from the trutee;
and in order further to fulfill its purpose of final distribution, it was representing creditors
in receiving and distributing this unclaimed fund.
4. In re Gubelman, 79 F. (2d) 976 (C. C. A. 2d, 1935). The dissent considered pay-
ment to the liquidating corporation a "final" distribution, barring the rights of plaintiff.
S. 30 STAT. 560 (1898), 11 U. S. C. A. § 93(n) (1927). The former period of one year
has been shortened to six months by amendment passed in 1926. 44 ST.*ar. 666 (1926); 11
U. S. C. A. Supp. § 93 (n) (1934). This section has universally been held to constitute an
absolute prohibition, leaving the court no discretion to extend the time. In re L. Wenar
Millinery Co., 1 F. (2d) 385 (N. D. Tex. 1923); GranmsT's CoLL=n, Biumaurcy 791.
6. In re Silk, 55 F. (2d) 917 (C. C. A. 2d, 1932) (petitioners failing to submit proofs of
claim within the six month period barred from sharing in newly discovered asets as against
partially paid creditors); Burton Coal Co. v. Franklin Coal Co., 67 F. (2d) 796 (C. C. A.
8th, 1933) (petitioner failing to make timely proof barred as against bankrupt from sharing
in newly discovered assets); In re Roaring River Furniture Co., S F. Supp. 974 (D. N.
C. 1934) (dilatory creditors barred as against bankrupt from realizing out of surplus left
after all creditors had been paid in full); cf. Wheeling Structural Steel Co. v. Moss, 62 F.
(2d) 37 (C. C. A. 4th, 1932).
7. In re Howard, 9 Wall. 175 (U. S. 1869) ; 01cott v. Headrick, 141 U. S. S43, 548 (1891);
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which are not subject to the rigid time limitation of Section 57(n) for proof of claim,
but which are governed by a time limit set by the trustee,8 are filed against a bank-
rupt's estate after the period set by the trustee has elapsed, they have been granted,
if brought to the attention of the court before final distribution. If presented after
final distribution, however, they are barred because of the inequity to diligent distri-
butees which, it is thought, would result.10 Consequently, it would seem that the
court in the instant case proceeded properly in holding that the time limitation im-
plied from Section 66(b) applied only as of the date when the fund left custodia lcgis,
that is, the date of actual distribution.
But, contrary to the contention of the majority, it is arguable that final distribu-
tion had occurred in the principal situation when the unclaimed dividend fund was
paid, at the order of the court, to the liquidating corporation. For, the time when
the fund leaves the custody of the court is the point in time at which dilatory creditors'
rights have been extinguished under the previously mentioned bar order and govern-
ment claim cases. Consequently, the fact that the dilatory petitioner first asserted
his right to the unclaimed dividends before the fund had been broken up and sent
to the individual creditors by the liquidating corporation, would seem to be immaterial
to the issue of whether distribution had been made by the court itself. The liquidating
corporation seems to have been the agent or the assignee of the diligent creditors, so
that distribution to it was, in effect, distribution to the numerous creditors repre-
sented by it. And, indeed, such distribution in gross to a representative, rather than
to numerous individuals themselves," seems to have been contemplated by the pro-
visions of 66(b) which, in ordering distribution to be made "under the direction of
the court," seems to allow for wide judicial discretion.1 2 Moreover, it would seem in-
equitable to the diligent creditors, who have set up this corporation for the express
purpose of relieving the court of extensive administrative burdens and in order to
reduce consequent costs to the estate, that they be penalized for this foresight, to
the advantage of negligent claimants who have been guilty of laches during the major
portion of the administration.
Employers' Liability Assurance Corp. v. Astoria Mahogany Co., Inc. 6 F. (2d) 945 (C. C. A.
2d, 1925); People v. Hopkins, 18 F. (2d) 731 (C. C. A. 2d, 1927); In re Studebaker-Wulff
Rubber Co., 33 F. (2d) 1004 (N. D. Ohio, 1929); In re Zimmerman, 66 F. (2d) 397, 399
(C. C. A. 2d, 1933).
8. See BANxRUpTcy Acr § 64(a). 30 STAT. 563 (1898); 11 U. S. A. § 104(a) (1927).
In re Cuban-Atlantic Transport Corp. 57 F. (2d) 963 (C. C. A. 2d, 1932).
9. United States v. Birmingham Trust & Savings Co., 258 Feb. 562, 564 (C. C. A. 5th,
1919; In re Stavin, 12 F. (2d) 471 (S. D. N. Y. 1925); Villere v. United States, 18 F. (2d)
409 (C. C. A. 5th, 1927); In re Moyer's Home Store, 26 F. (2d) 146 (E. D. Pa. 1927);
Wechsler v. United States, 27 F. (2d) 850 (C. C. A. 3d, 1928); United States v. Elliott, 57 F.
(2d) 843 (C. C. A. 6th, 1932); cf. In re Anderson, 279 Fed. 525 (C. C. A. 2d, 1922).
10. In re Morganstern & Co., 57 F. (2d) 163 (C. C. A. 2d, 1932); United Statea v.
Kaplan, 4 F. Supp. 563 (S. D. N. Y. 1933).
11. It ippears from briefs of counsel that 3,696 creditors asserted and proved claims in
the instant bankruptcy proceeding.
12. The wide discretion of the court in directing this sort of distribution to a repre-
sentative corporation seems adequately supported by precedent interpreting the import of
the phrase "under the direction of the court." See In re Orona Manufacturing Co., 269 Fed.
855 (D. Mass. 1921) (unclaimed dividends ordered to be distributed unless the sum were
too small an amount to justify the expense of distribution) ; In re Smith & Co., 52 F. (2d) 212
(D. Neb. 1931) (distribution of unclaimed dividends to accountants who, through over-
sight, had received no allowances); cf. Johnson v. Norris, 190 Fed. 459 (C. C. A. 5th, 1911).
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THE INCORPORATION OF A SALES DEPARTMENT AS A DEVICE TO SECURE CRErroRs
A LmBER company, unable to obtain an extension of bank credits because its ratio
of quick assets to current liabilities had fallen below the two-to-one ratio required
by the banks, formed a wholly-owned subsidiary "sales" corporation. To this sub-
sidiary it transferred current assets of $5,332,592. In return the subsidiary conveyed
its entire capital stock and assumed $2,356,068 of current liabilities, including the
amounts due the banks.' These amounts the banks then renewed on notes of the
subsidiary, since its books showed the required ratio of quick assets to current liabilities.
About a year later the parent went into receivership, and one of its creditors petitioned
the court to instruct the receiver to take over the subsidiary's assets on the ground
that the subsidiary was not a distinct and separate entity. The District Court granted
this petition.2 The Circuit Court of Appeals modified and affirmed the decree of the
District Court, deciding that, while the corporate entity of the subsidiary should be
disregarded, nevertheless, the parent was not insolvent in the bankruptcy sense at
the time it transferred its assets to the subsidiary, and thus legally could have paid
in full the banks and others who became creditors of the subsidiary. On the ground
that these creditors had acted for the best interests of all concerned in not demanding
immediate payment then, the court held them entitled to full payment as a condition
precedent to the receiver's taking over the subsidiary's assets.3
The basic issue in this and similar cases is not so much the validity of the sub-
sidiary's corporate entity as the advisability of permitting the use of the subsidiary
corporation as a device for obtaining the extension of loans or for raising new money.
Such a use of the subsidiary device may be of great practical advantage. Where a
business with ample assets to cover its liabilities nevertheless suffers from a shortage
of cash with which to meet maturing current liabilities, because a depressed market
has made ordinarily liquid assets unsalable, the subsidiary device makes it possible
to give a maximum amount of security to banks or other large creditors who are
pressing for payment. At the same time, it involves little or no dislocation of the
business as a whole.4 Security might, of course, be obtained by these creditors in
other ways. Their claims might be reduced to judgment and a levy made on free
assets. But such a course is likely to compel receivership or even bankruptcy.5 The
latter might defeat the object sought by the preferred creditors, in that the assets
levied upon could be recovered by the bankrupt's estate as a preference, if the petition
in bankruptcy were filed within four months of the levy. And even where receivership
1. The assets of the parent, prior to the transfer, were carried at $38,353,696, and its
liabilities were $14,327,084. These figures included current assets of $5,795,981 and current
liabilities of $3r324,865. Woodbury v. Pickering Lumber Co., 10 F. Supp. 761, 762 (VI. D.
Mo. 1933).
2. Woodbury v. Pickering Lumber Co., 10 F. Supp. 761 (W. D. Mo. 1933).
3. Commerce Trust Co. v. Woodbury, 77 F. (2d) 478 (C. C. A. 8th, 1935); cert. denied
56 Sup. Ct. 134 (1935).
4. Lumber companies seem to lead in the use of this device (tee note 18 infra). They
have a large fixed investment which cannot be tapped in a depression, and a finished product
which depreciates greatly in value when building trades decline. Except for gradual liquida-
tion of this finished product, their business is at a standstill, but is likely to resume activity
rapidly when building is started again. Thus transfer of this finished product to a sub-
sidiary is particularly convenient for them.
5. Because of the great depreciation in the value of quick assets. For example, the
sudden dumping on the market of $1,700,000 worth of the quick asset, finished lumber, in
the principal case might well have caused the value of all the quick assets to have dropped
below the amount due the banks, were it attempted.
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and not bankruptcy ensues, the preferred creditors might consider the result unde-
sirable in that it would prevent all other creditors from receiving the benefits of the
higher sale values of the assets, obtaining while the business is a going concern.
Again, a pledge of free assets could be made to the creditors demanding security. The
disadvantage of this method is that it necessitates complete relinquishment of control
over the assets pledged,6 which both dislocates the administration of the business and
is likely to cause other creditors to demand security for themselves, thus possibly
resulting in as rapid a descent into receivership or bankruptcy as would follow a
forced sale. A third possibility is to give these creditors a chattel mortgage on free
assets. This comes closest to attaining the result obtainable by forming a subsidiary
corporation, but there is a danger that the mortgage may be held invalid if the
mortgagor is allowed to retain possession of the mortgaged assets and to sell those
covered by the mortgage, substituting others.7 None of these methods provide the
combined advantages of complete security to the creditor and freedom of adminis-
tration by the debtor which attend the use of a subsidiary corporation for the same
purpose.
These practical advantages of the use of this device to obtain extension of credit
are sufficiently strong to justify its recognition as a valid method of giving security,
unless its use operates to put non-preferred creditors of the parent in a worse position
than they would be in if preference had been given in some other way. The latter
would not seem to be the case. If some creditors of the parent were secured by a
pledge or mortgage, instead of by the subsidiary device, those not so secured would
be able, if the parent were insolvent at the time of giving this security, to institute
bankruptcy proceedings within four months8 and to have such security set aside as
a preference. But in the event of bankruptcy or receivership occurring after that
period, they could set the security aside as a fraudulent conveyance only if the amount
pledged or mortgaged substantially exceeded the value of the debt secured.9 The
parent corporation's transfer of assets to the subsidiary while insolvent would seem
also to be an act of bankruptcy, entitling the unprefer.red creditors to throw the parent
into bankruptcy within four months and thus to recover the subsidiary's assets as a
preference. But in the event of bankruptcy or receivership occurring after four
months from the time of transfer, the result might differ from that obtaining in the
case of a pledge or mortgage. For, the stock of the subsidiary and the assumption
of debts would seem to be a fair consideration for the assets transferred, so that
the unpreferred creditors probably could not set the transfer aside as a fraudulent
conveyance.' o To this slight extent, then, it may be admitted that the subsidiary
device might put the unpreferred creditors in a worse position than would a preference
given by pledge or mortgage. It may also be argued that, since one of the primary
purposes of the subsidiary form of security is to avoid disrupting the business and
to enable it to continue operation as a unit, the subsidiary device is more likely than
6. Benedict v. Ratner, 268 U. S. 353 (1925); Hamilton Ridge Lumber Sales Corp. v.
Wilson, 25 F. (2d) 592 (C. C. A. 4th, 1928).
7. 2 JONES, CHATTEL MORTGAGES (6th ed. 1933) §§ 379-425; (1934) 44 YALs L. J. 448.
8. 30 STAT. 544 (1898), 11 U. S. C. A. § 1 (25) (1926); 30 STAT. 546 (1898), 11 U. S.
C. A. § 21 (1926); 36 STAT. 842 (1910), 11 U. S. C. A. § 96 (1926).
9. 2 JoNEs, CHATTEL MORTGAGES (6th ed. 1933) § 339a.
10. In re Braus, 248 Fed. 55 (C. C. A. 2d, 1917) and cases there cited; In re Commercial
Operating Corp., 77 F. (2d) 285 (C. C. A. 2d, 1935); Wagoner v. Wallace Turnbull Corp.
and Lumber Term., 306 Pa. 442, 160 At. 105 (1932); see Carson v. Long Bell Lumber
Corp., 73 F. (2d) 397, 402 (C. C. A. 8th, 1934); Scheck v. Bowne, 113 N. J. Eq. 51,
57, 166 Atl. 189, 191 (1933). But cf. 1st Natl Bank of Durham v. Raleigh Savings Bank
& Trust Co., 37 F. (2d) 301 (C. C. A. 4th, 1930).
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the other devices to prevent unpreferred creditors from knowing of the preference,
so as to be able to protect themselves by filing a bankruptcy petition within four
months.11 This, however, would be true as well if the assets were mortgaged. For,
the recordation of a mortgage is probably no more effective as notice to creditors
than is the filing of incorporation papers. Furthermore, if the parent is not insolvent
at the time of forming the subsidiary, but later becomes so, the grounds for in-
validating the transfer to the subsidiary would seem to be at least as strong as if
security had been given by pledge or mortgage. If the sale was incomplete, either
for non-compliance with a bulk sales act or for other technical reasoas,12 all assets
of the subsidiary are available to creditors of the parent. In addition, if there has
been a high degree of commingling of the assets of the parent and subsidiary, the
court is likely to administer the assets of both as if they were those of one cor-
poration.' 3 In this connection, however, it should be pointed out that many of the
grounds for disregarding the entity of a subsidiary corporation which appear in cases
where creditors of a subsidiary are suing a parent, such as occasional acts of direct
intervention in the subsidiary's affairs by officers of the parent, ought not to have
any bearing on the determination of whether creditors of the parent should be held
to have rights in the assets of the subsidiary.' 4 For, such acts of disregard of the
subsidiary's corporate entity could not possibly injure the parent's creditors, so as
to entitle them to claim against the subsidiary's assets.
The opinion in the principal case states clearly that the preference of the banks
attained by forming a subsidiary corporation was valid.15 It confuses the issue, hoy;-
ever, by disregarding the corporate entity of the subsidiary,' 6 although the result
sought to be reached by the decision does not seem to call for such- disregard 17
11. See Woodbury v. Pickering Lumber Co., 10 F. Supp. 761, 766 (W. D. Mo. 1933).
12. Hamilton Ridge Lumber Sales Corp. v. Wilson, 25 F. (2d) 592 (C. C. A. 4th,
1928); First National Bank of Durham v. Raleigh Savings Bank & Trust Co., 37 F. (2d)
301 (C. C. A. 4th, 1930).
13. See In re Rieger, Kapner & Altmark, 157 Fed. 609 (S. D. Ohio 1907); In re Loozthen
Piano Case Co., 261 Fed. 93 (D. N. J. 1919); Central Republic Bank & Trust Co. v.
Caldwell, 58 F. (2d) 721 (C. C. A. 8th, 1932); Trustees System of Pa. v. Payne, 65 F.
(2d) 103 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1933); see First Nat'l Bank of Seattle v. Walton, 146 Wash. 367,
376, 262 Pac. 984, 987 (1928); cf. First Nat'l Bank of Durham v. Raleigh Savings Bank,
37 F. (2d) 301 (C. C. A. 4th, 1930).
14. See Comment ( 1934) 43 Y.LE L. J. 472.
15. Commerce Trust Co. v. Woodbury, 77 F. (2d) 478, 490 (C. C. A. 8th, 1935).
16. Cases in which, in spite of disregard of the corporate entity of a subsidiary, "innocent"
creditors of the subsidiary are paid in full are not analogous to the principal case, since in
them the ground for payment is not the right of these creditors to preference as creditor.
of the parent, but their status as creditors of a corporation which has been held out to
them as a separate entity. Carroll v. Stem, 233 Fed. 123 (C. C. A. 6th, 1915); In re
Smith, 36 F. (2d) 697 (C. C. A. 2d, 1929) (one man corporation); Jackson v. A. H. Thomas
Inv. Co., 46 F. (2d) 252 (C. C. A. 5th, 1931) (one man corporation); Day v. Pozt1
Telegraph Co., 66 Md. 354, 7 AUt. 603 (1887); see In re Eilers Music House 270 Fed. 915,
925 (C. C. A. 9th, 1921); In re Rieger, Kapner & Altmark, 157 Fed. 609, 613 (S. D. Ohio,
1907); cf. In re John Koke Co., 38 F. (2d) 232 (C. C. A. 9th, 1930); In re Industrial
Loan and Guaranty Co., Decree of Judge Gmbb (N. D. Ala., Aug. 20, 1935).
17. The special master attained the same result by maintaining the distinct entity of
the subsidiary, and directing the receiver to handle the affairs of the subsidiary through
stock ownership. Commerce Trust Co. v. Woodbury, 77 F. (2d) 478, at 485 (C. C. A.
8th, 1935). The decision of the Circuit Court of Appeals to disregard the corporate entity
of the subsidiary and nevertheless to allow its creditors to be paid in full may perhaps be
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It would seem that in most cases of this type the preference attained by formation
of a subsidiary can be expected to be upheld,18 unless (1) there is such commingling
of assets as to necessitate disregard of the corporate entity of the subsidiary;
13 (2)
the sale to the subsidiary is technically incomplete; 12 or, (3) insolvency of the parent
at the time of forming the subsidiary makes possible the bringing of a bankruptcy
petition within four months.8
DISPOSITION OF UNCLAIMED DISTRIBUTIVE SHARES OF A DISSOLVED CORPORATION
A COPPER company incorporated under the laws of Arizona was dissolved in 1922,
and, after paying all its debts, had on hand more than two million dollars in cash
as its sole assets. This money was directed to be divided pro rata among the stock-
holders. After thirteen years had passed there were over six hundred stockholders
of record who had not been found; and the former directors of the corporation, who
had been appointed trustees for the purpose of winding up its affairs, brought pro-
ceddings to determine what should be done with the money remaining in their hands.
The State of Arizona answered, claiming the property by escheat. The known
stockholders claimed the money on the ground that the stockholders who had not
been found were fictitious persons and had never existed. The judgment of the trial
court for the known stockholders was reversed on appeal.' It was held that they
were not entitled to the money, as they had failed to overcome the prima facie
presumption that the persons whose names appeared on the corporation's stock
book actually existed; nor could the state take the money under the escheat statute,2
for the unknown stockholders were nonresidents of the state and, furthermore,
there was no showing that they did not have heirs. However, the Arizona constitution
provides that all unclaimed shares and dividends of any corporation incorporated
under the laws of Arizona shall be paid into a general school fund;3 and under this
provision, the state was awarded the money. The court presumed that if any of the
true owners subsequently appeared the state would grant proper relief.
The decisions involving the issue presented by the instant case have not been in
accord. One line of cases is based upon the doctrine, now firmly established, that,
upon dissolution, the assets of a corporation constitute a trust fund for the benefit
of creditors and stockholders. 4 It is argued that by trust fund is meant common
explained on the ground that the court was anxious to make a final disposition of a case
which had been in litigation for 4 years, by "modifying and affirming" the District Court
rather than remanding for a new trial.
18. It has been upheld, in addition to the principal case, in the following: Carson v.
Long Bell Lumber Corp., 73 F. (2d) 397 (C. C. A. 8th, 1934); Wagoner v. Wallace Turnbull
Corp. & Lumber Terminals, 306 Pa. 442, 160 Atl. 105 (1932); First National Bank of
Seattle v. Walton, 146 Wash. 367, 262 Pac. 984 (1928). Contra: Hamilton Ridge Lumber
Sales Corp. v. Wilson, 25 F. (2d) 592 (C. C. A. 4th, 1928) (incomplete sale); cf, First
National Bank of Durham v. Raleigh Savings Bank & Trust Co., 37 F. (2d) 301 (C. C. A.
4th, 1930); Scripps v. Crawford, 123 Mich. 173, 81 N. W. 1098 (1900) (stock of subsidiary
pledged as collateral); N. Y. Trust Co. v. Island Oil & Transport Co., 56 F. (2d) 580
(C. C. A. 2d, 1932) (no intent to prefer subsidiary's creditors).
1. In re Hull Copper Co., 50 P. (2d) 560 (Ariz. 1935).
2. ARiz. REv. Coox ANN. (Struckmeyer, 1928) § 4304.
3. Amix. CoNqsT. art. XI, § 8.
4. American Loan & Trust Co. v. Grand Rivers Co., 159 Fed. 775 (C. C. W. D. Ky.
1908); Scott v. Gittings, 125 Md. 595, 94 AtI. 209 (1915). At early common law It was
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fund, or a fund upon which a number of persons have a common claim, title to a
separate share not being vested in any individual claimant.
5 Accordingly, the court
has the power to require that all persons having claims upon the fund present and
prove them within a specified time or be forever barred, and, upon the expiration of
that time, to make a pro rata distribution among those who have proved their right
thereto. Upon this reasoning, the judgment of the lower court in the instant case,
directing that if the unknown stockholders did not appear by a certain date the
money should be distributed among the known claimants, could be justified. And
from a practical standpoint a strong argument can be made for such a holding.
For, since their share upon dissolution may represent only a small part of their
original investment, the investors' claims upon any fortuitous surplus seem stronger
than a stranger's. Moreover, the logic of the instant decision would, in a case
where unknown bondholders rather than unknown stockholders were involved, lead
to the especially unfair result, assuming that the bondholders were never found, that
the undistributed assets would be turned over to the state even though the claims
of the general creditors and stockholders, or, perhaps, those of other bondholders, had
not been satisfied.
The more general holding in such cases, however, is that when a corporation is
dissolved and dividends declared, title to the distributive shares vests immediately
in the respective shareholders.6 Thus, the known stockholders have no right to the
money set aside for the stockholders who cannot be found. The money, therefore, is
unclaimed and must be disposed of accordingly.7
The law in regard to the disposition of unclaimed money is almost entirely statu-
held that upon the dissolution of a corporation its real estate reverted to the original
owners or their heirs, its personal property escheated to the Crown or state, and all debts
due to it and from it were extinguished. The injustice of this rule led to the adoption of
the trust fund theory. Wood v. Dummer, 30 Fed. Cas. No. 17,944, at 435 (C. C. D. Me.
1824). Originally applied only to creditors, the doctrine was extended to include stoc:-
holders as well. Bacon v. Robertson, 18 How. 480 (U. S. 1856). See generally Pepper,
The "Trust Fund Theory" of the Capital Stock of a Corporation (1893) 32 Am. L. REG.
(n.s.) 175; Note (1927) 47 A. L. R. 1288 et seq. There is some uncertainty as to whether
or not the early common law rule still prevails in England. Farrer, Reverter to the Donor
of the Legal Fee Vested in a Dissolved Corporation (1933) 49 L. Q. Rzv. 240; Farrer,
Reverter to Donor on a Determinable Fee (1934) S0 L. Q. REv. 33. For reply to thee
articles see Hughes, Reverter to the Donor of the Legal Fee Vested.in a Dissolved Corpora-
tion (1935) 51 L. Q. REv. 347.
5. Cf. Brown v. Pennsylvania Canal Co., 274 Fed. 467, 468 (E. D. Pa. 1921); Stone
v. Edwards, 32 Ga. App. 479, 485, 124 S. E. 54, 56 (1924).
6. In re Central New Jersey Land & Improvement Co.'s Dissolution, 113 N. J. Eq. 332,
166 AtL 705 (1933). Cf. Jerome v. Cogswell, 204 U. S. 1 (1907); Smith v. Taecler, 133
Cal. App. 351, 24 P. (2d) 182 (1933); 2 Coox, CoPno1ATxO.ros (8th ed. 1923) § 541; 3
Coox, op. cit., § 641; 16 FLmTCHR, CowoRATiOs (Rev. ed. 1933) § 8224.
7. Brown v. Pennsylvania Canal Co., 279 Fed. 417 (C. C. A. 3d, 1922), afi'g 274 Fed.
467 (E. D. Pa. 1921); Drascovich v. Equitable Trust Co. of New York, 3 F. (2d) 724
(C. C. A. 9th, 1925), aff'g 299 Fed. 304 (N. D. Cal 1923); In re Advance Beneficial
Order's Assigned Estate, 48 Pa. Super. 197 (1911); cf. Seaboard Nat. Bank v. Rogers Miilk
Products Co., 21 F. (2d) 414 (C. C. A. 2d, 1927). The cost of ascertaining the where-
abouts of unknown bondholders may be paid out of the moneys belonging to them. House
v. Amsdell Brewing & Malting Co., 133 App. Div. 486, 117 N. Y. Supp. 796 (3d
Dep't, 1909).
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tory,s and there is little uniformity among the various jurisdictions.0 When the
assets of a dissolved corporation are under the control of a federal court and
certain bondholders or stockholders cannot be found, the situation is governed by a
federal statute, requiring that all moneys paid into a federal court shall immediately
be deposited with the Treasurer, or a designated depository of the United States,
"in the name and to the credit of such court." 10 Although, originally, it was further
provided that, when the right to the money is not in dispute and it had been
unclaimed for at least ten years, it should be deposited in the Treasury of the
United States, "to the credit of the United States,"" this original provision was
held unconstitutional as depriving the owners of their property without due process
of law.12 It was subsequently amended to provide that any person proving his right
to the money could secure it upon obtaining a court order to that effect.' 3
Of the states, only two appear to have passed statutes which would be directly
applicable to the situation in the instant case.14 These provide that upon the dissolu-
tion of a corporation any unclaimed distributive shares shall be paid into the state
treasury. In a few others, general statutes in regard to depositing unclaimed money
with the state would probably apply.'5 In most states, however, as in the jurisdiction
in which the instant case was decided, there are no statutes upon which a decision
could be based, and generally no applicable constitutional provisions such as the one
upon which the principal case turned. Future difficulties would be avoided, therefore,
if these states passed statutes governing such situations.
Although in certain cases in which a corporation is dissolved, turning over un-
claimed distributive shares to the state or federal governments may work an injustice
8. Irrespective of statute, however, a state generally has the right to take posselon
of property within its jurisdiction of which there appears to be no owner. See Common.
wealth of Kentucky v. Thomas, 140 Ky. 789, 795, 131 S. W. 797, 800 (1910).
9. Most of the statutes are limited to specific kinds of unclaimed property. Thus, a
number require that bank deposits which have been unclaimed for a certain length of
time be deposited with the state. Such statutes are constitutional. Security Savings
Bank v. California, 263 U. S. 282 (1923). See Notes (1919) 1 A. L. R. 1054; (1924) 31
A. L. R. 398. Gas and electric corporations' consumer deposits, unclaimed for 15 years,
must in New York be paid to the state treasurer. Brooklyn Borough Gas Co. v. Bennett,
154 Misc. 106, 277 N. Y. Supp. 203 (Sup. Ct. 1935). Cf. Territory of Alaska v. First
Nat. Bank, 41 F. (2d) 186 (C. C. A. 9th, 1930); In re Link's Estate, 180 AtI. 1 (Pa. 1935);
Deaderick v. Washington County Court, 41 Tenn. 202 (1860). But cf. Moore v. Eastman
Gardiner Lumber Co., 156 Miss. 359, 126 So. 44 (1930).
10. REv. STAT. § 995 (1875), 28 U. S. C. A. § 851 (1926).
11. 29 STAT. 578 (1897).
12. American Loan & Trust Co. v. Grand Rivers Co., 159 Fed. 775 (C. C. W. D. Ky.
1908). It was believed that the statute, if enforced, would result in an escheat of the
property to the United States, and there was serious doubt as to whether or not the
federal government had power to take property by escheat. See Note (1908) 67 Car'.
L. J. 429. But cf. In re Moneys in Registry of District Court, 170 Fed. 470 (E. D. Pa. 1909).
13. 36 STAT. 1083 (1911), 28 U. S. C. A. § 852 (1926). Since then, the cases In the
federal courts concerning money belonging to unknown bondholders of dissolved corporations
have been disposed of by turning over the money to the federal government. Brown v.
Pennsylvania Canal Co., 279 Fed. 417 (C. C. A. 3d, 1922); Drascovlch v. Equitable Trust
Co. of New York, 3 F. (2d) 724 (C. C. A. 9th, 1925). The same reasoning would apply,
of course, in cases where stockholders could not be found.
14. M im. STAT. (Mason, 1927) § 7642; PA. STAT. AMN. (Purdon, 1930) tit. 15, § 551,
15. By virtue of such a statute, unclaimed shares of certificate holders in a beneficial
corporation were given to the state. In re Advance Beneficial Order's Assigned Estate,
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on the other investors, it is probable that this will be the general result in the future.
In favor of such a result, it may be argued that it protects the interest of the
unknown claimant, the party primarily entitled to the money. For, unless a statute
otherwise provides,1 6 it would seem that the unknown claimant, or his legal repre-
sentative, is, as least in theory, entitled to secure the money at any time, since a
dissolution dividend is similar to an ordinary dividend, 17 and the statute of limita-
tions generally does not begin to run against a claim for an ordinary dividend until
there has been a demand.18
VALIDITY or GOLD CLAusEs IN INTERNATIONAL CONTRACTS
THE Supreme Court, in Norman v. Baltimore and Ohio Rr. Co., decided that the
Joint Resolution of Congress' abrogating gold clauses was constitutional in its appli-
cation to purely domestic contracts. 2 Since that decision courts throughout the world
have been concerned with the problem of how far the terms of the Joint Resolution
apply to various other kinds of obligations, such as contracts made subject to the
law of other countries, contracts to which one or both parties are foreigners, and
domestic contracts payable in foreign money. In a recent New York case a bond-
holder domiciled in Colombia sued a Finnish corporation on bonds issued by the
latter in New York and payable there "in gold coin of the United States of America
of the standard of weight and fineness as it existed on July 1, 1924." The Court of
Appeals declined to enforce the gold clause on the ground that the Joint Resolution
applies to all contracts subject to New York law, and for the additional reason that
gold clauses are now deemed to be contrary to our public policy, as declared by
Congress, and hence are unenforceable in the United States under any circumstances.3
That New York law governs the contract in this case can hardly be disputed,
whether the test applied is the place of contracting,4 the place of performance,5 or
the intention of the parties.6 But the question of whether the Joint Resolution extends
to this situation, and, if so, whether it bears a reasonable relationship to Congress'
power to regulate money is not settled so easily. It is a general rule of construction
that legislation is presumptively territorial in its application. 7  Moreover, a statute
48 Pa. Super. 197 (1911). Cf. I.r.. Rnv. STAT. (1935) c. 141, § 5; Wis. STAT. (1931)
§§ 59.89, 59.90.
16. The Minnesota statute provides that after the money has been deposited with the
state for ten years all claims shall be barred. A.mn. STAT. (Mason, 1927) § 7642. Such
a state statute is probably constitutional. Cf. Hamilton v. Brown, 161 U. S. 256 (1896);
Alton's Estate, 220 Pa. 258, 69 Atl. 902 (1903).
17. Larwill v. Burke, 19 Ohio Cir. Ct. 513 (1900).
18. 2 Coon, op. cit. supra note 6, § 543, and cases there cited. Unexcusable laches,
however, may bar a recovery. Citizens' Savings & Trust Co. v. Belleville & S. I. R. Co.,
157 Fed. 73 (C. C. A. 7th, 1907).
1. 48 STAT. 113 (1933), 31 U. S. C. A. § 463 (1934).
2. 294 U. S. 240 (1935). For historical and economic background on this subject see
Nebolsine, The Gold Clause in Private Cotracts (1933) 42 Y,=r L. J. 1051. Regarding
international problems, see Nussbaum, Gold Clause Abrogation (1934) 44 Y,=n L. J. S3;
Nussbaum, International Legal Effects of Dollar Depredation (1935) 2 U. or Cnr. L. Ray. 291.
3. Compania de Inversiones Internacionales v. Industrial Mortgage Bank of Finland, 269
N. Y. 22, 198 N. E. 617 (1935).
4. R.sTATEENT, Co-rLicr oF L.ws (1934) § 332.
5. Id. §§ 358,364,370; Benton v. Safe Deposit Bank, 255 N. Y. 260, 174 N. E. 648 (1931).
6. Wilson v. Lewiston Mlill Co., 150 N. Y. 314, 44 N. E. 959 (1896).
7. Sandburg v. McDonald, 248 U. S. 185 (1918).
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which is designed to meet a particular need, and which has the effect of frustrating
legitimate business obligations, ought to be construed no more broadly than is
actually required to fulfill its purposes.8 The Government's monetary program, of
which the invalidation of gold clauses was a part, was intended to relieve the burdens
of domestic debtors by raising the price level, and to protect our foreign commerce
against the competition of other nations which had already devalued their currencies.
Gold clause abrogation was a necessary feature of this scheme because del~tors could
not be aided by inflation so long as they were obliged to pay an amount measured
in terms of gold. Moreover, it was believed that to require large numbers of debtors,,
whose incomes were received in devalued currency, to pay 69% more dollars to dis.
charge their obligations would bring about a serious dislocation of the domestic
economy.' 0 Although these grounds justify the Joint Resolution as applied to the
obligations of citizens of the United States, they do not require its application to
contracts between foreigners. 1
There is a real difference in the economic effects of abrogating the gold clause in
domestic and international contracts. Although there may be some justification for
the assertion that the gold clause in domestic obligations is only a draftsman's habit,
at least in international trade gold is regarded as the only stable unit of value which
is available for eliminating the highly speculative risks of fluctuating currency ex-
change rates.' 2 Moreover, dollar devaluation does not affect the ability of the foreign
debtor to earn and pay his debt in gold because, unlike the domestic obligor, he is
earning his funds not in dollars, but in gold or some currency whose value in terms
of gold has not been affected by the devaluation of the dollar. The result, therefore,
of abrogating the gold clause in a contract between two foreigners is to benefit the
debtor substantially, since he is required to convert into dollars 40% less of his
own currency than formerly, while the creditor suffers a corresponding loss in ex-
changing the sum received into his own currency.'8 Thus, while the application of
8. Cf. Dean v. Metropolitan Elevated Ry. Co., 119 N. Y. 540, 23 N. E. 1094 (1890);
Feiber Realty Corp. v. Abel, 265 N. Y. 94, 191 N. E. 847 (1934).
9. See President Roosevelt's Radio Address of Oct. 22, 1933, 137 Com. & FIX. CiRox.
3033; Proclamation by the President, No. 2067, Dec. 21, 1933, 31 U. S. C. A. § 821, n.
(1934); H. R. REP. No. 169, 73d Cong., 1st Sess., Ser. No. 9774 (1933).
10. See Norman v. Baltimore and Ohio Rr. Co., 294 U. S. 240, 315 (1935).
11. It should be kept in mind that gold dollars of a particular standard are In reality
a measure of value and not a mode of payment. Norman v. Baltimore & Ohio Rr. Co.,
294 U. S. 240, 302 (1935); cf. Feist v. Soci~t6 Intercommunale Belge d'Electricit6, L. R.
[1934] A. C. 161. Therefore there is no ground for the fear expressed by the court In the
instant case that the enforcement of the gold clause would result in a "dual monetary
system" such as that involved in Bronson v. Rodes, 7 Wall. 229 (U. S. 1868)..
12. See Hanna, Currency Control and Private Property (1933) 33 COL. L. Ray. 617,
633, n. 20.
13. However, despite the fact that gold clause abrogation aids the debtor and hurts
the creditor, nevertheless in this particular instance the debtor will pay more funnarks and
the creditor will receive more pesos than were involved when the bonds were Issued.
This is due to the fact that the depreciation of their own currencies during that period
was greater than the devaluation of the dollar in 1933. In July, 1924, when the bonds
were issued, the Finnish markka was worth $.0251 and the Colombian peso $.9974, MooD,
HA10BOOK or FOREIGN CuRRENCY AND EXCI&N'O- (1930) 51, 69. Now the markka Is worth
about $.0218 and the peso about $.51 in the present United States money. Whether this
amounts to an actual gain or a loss depends upon the movement of the price level where
each party does business. But even if this were to be determined, it would have no
bearing on the question of whether the Joint Resolution should apply to these parties, for
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the Joint Resolution to domestic contracts achieves economic stability by giving the
average creditor approximately the same purchasing power that the dollars he lent had,
its application to contracts between two foreigners causes disparity. Therefore
it would seem that the foreign bondholder has a strong equitable claim that his
contract be enforced according to its terms, particularly when no harm to the monetary
system of the United States can be shown to result therefrom. In the principal
case the Court says that even if conflicts of law rules had made the law of the United
States inapplicable to the contract nevertheless courts in this country must refuse to
enforce the gold clause for reasons of public policy. This conclusion seems in-
appropriate, for it is hard to imagine that the United States has any interest in
alleviating the debts of Finnish banks at the expense of South American bondholders.
On the other hand the unqualified language employed in the Joint Resolution, if
taken literally, applies to every obligation subject to the law of the United States.
Although it is by no means clear that Congress intended to alter contracts wholly
between residents of other countries, there is considerable evidence that the terms
of the joint Resolution were thought to include some international obligations, in
particular the debts owed by foreigners to residents of the United States.1j 4 Further-
more, practical reasons furnish excellent grounds for rejecting the proposals to differ-
entiate between domestic and international contracts. If the distinction were to be
made, the problem of where to draw the line would always be troublesome. Although
French courts for a number of years have enforced gold clauses in international
obligations while refusing to do so in domestic contracts, their doctrine has not only
proved difficult to apply, but has provoked the accusation that in a controversy
between a French citizen and a foreigner the courts are much more likely to conclude
that there is an "international payment," and enforce the gold clause, if the Frenchman
is the obligee, than when he happens to be the debtor 1, Another practical objection
to the differentiation is the possible advantage which it might give to foreign gold
bonds in the investment market because of the fear of another devaluation. Many
investors who would be attracted to these obligations if the courts of the United
States upheld their gold value would not be tempted by foreign bonds if the gold
clauses could be enforced abroad only.
Further support for the result announced in the instant case is to be found in the
decisions of other courts.16 A recent declaratory judgment in England held that the
Joint Resolution of Congress applies even to the obligations of the British Govern-
ment which are payable in dollars, despite the fact that the law of England governs
these contracts.' 7 The broad language of the instant case, applying the Joint
the United States' monetary policy is not concerned with relieving foreign debtors from
the effects of the fluctuation of their currencies.
14. See 77 CONG. Rzc. 4539-4545, 4563 (1933); Statement of Secretary of the Treasury
Woodin, U. S. News, May 20-27, 1933 at 3, col. 2; Norman v. Baltimore & Ohio Rr. Co.
294 U. S. 240, 378 (1935).
15. See Nussbaum, Gold Clause Abrogation (1934) 44 YA= L. J. 53j 61.
16. Foreign cases are analyzed by Nussbaum, note 15, supra.
A situation which must be distinguished from the instant case is that in which the con-
tract provides for payment of gold currency in another country. Such contracts are regarded
in the United States as calling for the delivery of a commodity, and hence are not affected
by the Joint Resolution. Anglo-Continental Treuhand A. G. v. St. Louis S. W. Ry.,
(C. C. A. 2d) reported in N. Y. L. J., Jan. 10, 1935, at 339; McAdoo v. Southern Pacific Co.,
10 F. Supp. 953 (N. D. Cal. 1935). Contra: City Bank Farmers Trust Co. v. Bethlehem
Steel Co., 280 N. Y. Supp. 494 (App. Div. 1st Dept. 1935). See (1935) 35 CoL L. RE%.
1132; (1935) 49 HARv. L. Rry. 152.
17. In the Matter of the Petition of Right of International Trustee (K. B. Div., Nov. 8,
1935) N. Y. L. J., Dec. 7, 1935, at 2279.
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Resolution literally to every dollar obligation subject to United States law, and
embracing, on grounds of public policy, every action brought within the United States,
should go far to clear up existing doubts.
STATE TAXATION OF INDIANS' ROYALTIES FROm LEASE OF TAX-EXEMPT
TMAL RESOURCES
THm mineral resources of Osage land are, by congressional act,1 given to the
United States to hold in trust for the tribe. Royalties derived from a lease of such
resources are payable to the United States Treasury to be held for the Indians.
However, when the Secretary of the Interior is satisfied that an individual Indian
is able to manage his own property, the Secretary is permitted to issue to that Indian
a certificate of competency entitling him to the unrestricted use of his pro rata
share of tribal royalties. Oklahoma imposed an income tax on a competent Osage's
royalties from a lease of tribal oil rights.. The Oklahoma Supreme Court upheld
the tax on the ground that, since the income was free from government control, the
tax could not interfere with a federal instrumentality.2 Three judges dissented on
the grounds that the resources are admittedly federal instrumentalities, and that a
state tax on royalties therefrom is a direct tax on the resources themselves and
hence invalid. The United States Supreme Court has granted certiorari.8
A federal instrumentality is generally defined as any agency or means, such as a
federal judge or a federal bond, employed in carrying out the functions of the fed-
eral government.4 Indian lands and leases thereof have always been considered
instrumentalities by which the government fulfills its guardian duty to the Indlans.5
Such instrumentalities have generally been held absolutely exempt from state taxa-
tion on the ground that otherwise a state might, by taxation, defeat the purposes of
the federal government. 6 Further, when, as in the instant case, a state tax is on
income derived from a federal instrumentality, the tax has been invariably treated
as directly on the instrumentality itself.7 Thus, in Gillespie v. Oklahoma,8 a state
income tax on the profits made by a lessee of Indian lands was held invalid.0 The
1. 34 STAT. 539 (1906), extended by 45 STAT. 1478 (1929).
2. The Oklahoma court also relied on Choteau v. Burnet, 283 U. S. 691 (1931), allow-
ing a federal income tax on a similar royalty. Clearly, however, a federal tax on a fed-
eral instrumentality is always permissible; and in the Choteau case, the court expressly
mentioned that such royalties were beyond state power to tax.
3. Leahy v. State Treasurer of Oklahoma, 49 P. (2d) 570 (1935), cert. granted, U. S.
Sup. Ct., Jan. 6, 1936.
4. Dewey County v. United States, 26 F. (2d) 434 (C. C. A. 8th, 1928).
5. United States v. Rickert, 188 U. S. 432 (1903); Jaybird Mining Co. v. Weir, 271
U. S. 609 (1926).
6. McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316 (1819); Johnson v. Maryland, 254 U. S.
51 (1920). The same rule is used in the analogous situation of a federal tax on a
state instrumentality. The Collector v. Day, 11 Wall. 113 (1870).
7. Gillespie v. Oklahoma, 257 U. S. 501 (1922); Pollock v. Farmers Loan and Trust
Co., 157 U. S. 429 (1895).
8. 257 U. S. 501 (1922).
9. The Court has allowed extensive exemptions in Indian cases. United States v.
Rickert, 188 U. S. 432 (1903); Choctaw, Oklahoma & Gulf Rr. Co. v. Harrison, 235
U. S. 292 (1914); Indian TErritory Illuminating Oil Co. v. Oklahoma, 240 U. S. 522
(1916); Jaybird Mining Co. v. Weir, 271 U. S. 609 (1926); Carpenter v. Shaw, 280 U. S.
363 (1930). But cf. Thomas v. Gay, 169 U. S. 264 (1898); Cosier et al. v. McMillan,
22 Mont. 484, 5d Pac. 965 (1899). See Brown, The Taxation of India, Property (1931)
15 MiN.. L. REv. 182.
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latter holding would seem equally pertinent to an attempt of the state to tax the
royalties received by Indians from the lease of their lands. The Oklahoma
Supreme Court is apparently ignoring all precedent in treating the instant tax as
affecting only income.
But even if the instant tax be admitted to be on a federal instrumentality, it
would seem defensible. As a consequence of the enlargement of the field of gov-
ernment activity, the absolute immunity doctrine has threatened so tremendous an
irradiation of exemption from state taxation that the recent tendency has been to
forbid only those taxes that substantially hinder the operations of the federal gov-
ernment . 0 Each tax must be tested in the light of the purpose of the instru-
mentality involved, and the effect the tax has on that purpose." As yet it is not
clear to what extent this effect test has supplanted the absolute immunity doctrine,
because the United States Supreme Court, probably through caution in the face of
such a mass of contrary precedent, has been distinguishing rather than overruling
the old cases.' 2 However, it is now well settled that the effect test will be used
where a tax is only indirectly on a federal instrumentality.13 Thus the profits from
the assignment of an exempt oil lease are taxable even though profits from oil pro-
duced under the lease are exempt.14 Further, a direct state tax on a federal instru-
mentality was upheld in Fox Films v. Doyal,15 where the Supreme Court expressly
overruling a prior case,16 allowed a tax on copyright royalties, holding that, since
the government reserved no financial interest in the copyright, its use being wholly
for private profit, the purpose of the immunity doctrine would not be served by
holding the royalties absolutely exempt from state taxation.
If the Supreme Court should desire for practical reasons to limit the hitherto
extensive Indian exemption,9 the reasoning of the Fox Films case would seem
applicable, the government having no financial interest in the income received by
Indians, nor even the interest that a guardian has in the maintenance of his
ward, at least where the Indian has, as in the instant case, received a certificate of
competency entitling him to free use of his income. The Gillespie case, although
contrary was in line with the general judicial tendency to favor the Indian,"
which was based on the fact that during the last century almost all the Indians
were uneducated and utterly incapable of managing the large amount of property
10. Railroad Co. v. Peniston, 18 Wall. 5 (1873); Federal Compress & Warehouse Co.
v, McLean, 291 U. S. 17 (1934). A similar development has taken place where there Is
a federal tax on a state instrumentality. Metcalf & Eddy v. Mitchel, 269 U. S. 514
(1926); Burnet v. A. T. Jergins Trust, 283 U. S. 50 (1933). See Comment (1932) 81
U. PA. L. Rv. 194; Note (1932) 41 YAxx L. 1. 1237.
11. See Shaw v. Gibson-Zahniser, 276 U. S. 575, 578 (1928).
12. Earlier cases have been narrowly limited. Jaybird Mining Co. v. Weir, 271 U. S.
609 (1926); limited by Indian Territory Illuminating Oil Co. v. Board of Equalization
of Tulsa County, 288 U. S. 325 (1933). United States v. Richert, 188 U. S. 432 (1903),
limited by McCurdy v. United States, 246 U. S. 263 (1918). Gillespie v. Oklahoma, 257
U. S. 501 (1922), followed in Burnet v. Coronado, 285 U. S. 393 (1932), but limited by
Group No. 1 Oil Corp. v. Bass, 283 U. S. 279 (1931); Burnet v. A. T. Jergins Trust,
288 U. S. 503 (1933); Wanless Iron Co. v. Commicsoner, 75 F. (2d) 779 (C. C. A. 8th,
1935); and Eckstein v. United States, 10 F. Supp. 231 (Ct. CI, 193S).
13. Willcuts v. Bunn, 282 U. S. 216 (1931) ; Burnet v. Jergins Trust, 288 U. S. 503 (1933);
Marland v. United States, 53 F. (2d) 907 (1931).
14. Marland v. United States, 53 F. (2d) 907 (1931).
15. 286 U. S. 123 (1932).
16. Long v. Rockwood, 277 U. S. 142 (1928).
17. Childers v. Beaver, 270 U. S. 55 (1926).
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which they possessed. Although many Indians are still incompetent, and federal
policy may require that they remain exempt from state taxation, there are a con-
siderable number who have now become completely capable of taking care of their
own property, as witnessed by the government's issuance of certificates of com-
petency to them, giving them practically complete control of their property, and
subjecting them to many of the duties of citizenship.18 Thus a competent Indian
is subject to the federal income tax,19 and lands held in severalty by him are,
by congressional consent, generally subject to state taxation.20 Indeed, the latter
fact would seem to indicate that the possibility of state sales of competent Indians'
lands for non-payment of taxes,-a possibility which might well be the strongest
argument for exemption of the Indians' income from state taxation2L-is not looked
upon by the federal government as threatening interference with its functions. Hence,
if the instant tax is tested in terms of its effect on the operations of the federal
government, the tax is seemingly no hindrance, but, rather, in aid of the federal
policy of treating competent Indians as citizens. There thus seems to be no prac-
tical justification for exempting income received by them from the lease of Indian
lands, merely because the source is subject to federal control.
22
Indian exemption has long prevented Oklahoma revenues from being sufficient to
satisfy all the needs of a modern state.2 The instant case affords the Court an
opportunity to overrule Gillespie v. Oklahomas-at least so far as its implications
would result in exemption of the income of competent Indians-and thus to limit
exemption to situations in which it may perform some useful function.
18. Choteau v. Burnet, 283 U. S. 691 (1931). The statutory provisions are not always
uniform for different tribes. 34 STAT. 1221 (1907); 34 STAT. 542 (1906).
19. Since the federal government clearly can tax the Indians, the issue Is only whether
a specific tax statute was intended to include them. Choteau v. Burnet, 283 U. S. 691
(1931) ; Superintendent of 5 Civilized Tribes v. Commissioner, 295 U. S. 418 (1935).
20. 34 STAT. 542 (1906). Congress has the power to subject any federal instrumentality
to state taxation by consenting to such taxation. United States v. Board Osage County,
193 Fed. 485 (W. D. Okla., 1911). Even in the case of incompetent Indians, there has
been a judicial trend allowing state taxation of their land and personal property where
it is not an original allotment. United States v. Gray, 284 Fed. 103 (C. C. A. 8th, 1922);
United States v. Mummert, 15 F. (2d) 926 (C. C. A. 8th, 1926); Work v. Mummert, 29
F. (2d) 393 (C. C. A. 8th, 1928); United States v. Hughes, 6 F. Supp. 972 (N. D. Okla,,
1934); cf. Shaw v. Gibson-Zahniser, 276 U. S. 575 (1928).
21. Exemption of Indian property has been based frequently on the belief that lia-
bility to taxation would cause a rapid loss of Indian property through sales for non-
payment of taxes. See United States v. Rickert, 188 U. S. 432, 442 (1903); Brown, supra
note 9, at 192.
22. The instant taxpayer did not object to paying a state income tax on his income
other than from tribal royalties. Supplemental Brief of Plaintiff in Error 3, 11, Leahy v.
State Treasurer of Oklahoma, 49 P. (2d) 570 (1935).
23. As to the effect on the Oklahoma school system, see H. R. Rep. No. 1454, 60th
Cong. 1st Sess. (1908). But Congress has consented to inroads on the exemption by a
gross production tax. Act March 3, 1921, § 5, 41 STAT. 1250. For the limits of the extent
of this consent, see State v. Barnsdall Refineries, 56 Sup. Ct. 340 (1936).
The instant tax was expressly passed as an emergency measure to reduce the prohibitive
rate of property taxation. Three-fourths of the proceeds are to go for local schools,
O=.A. STAT. Axm. (Harlow, 1931) § 12499.
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EFFECT OF JOINING TAX AND APPRoPRIATION MxAsuREs IN SAE Acr-TH COLO-
.ADo OLD AGE PENSIONS
To provide funds for the payment of old age pensions, a Colorado statute imposes
three taxes: a ten per cent addition to incorporation fees, an addition of one dollar
to the annual motor vehicle registration fee, and a ten per cent addition upon the
amount of any inheritance tax.1 The executors of an estate subject to the ordinary
state inheritance tax protested against the payment of the additional tax imposed
by this statute, contending that the act imposed a tax for county purposes and
violated the uniformity clause of the Colorado constitution, and that it was a taking
of property by taxation for a non-public purpose in violation of the equal protection
and due process clauses of both state and Federal Constitutions. The Supreme
Court of Colorado upheld the statute, two justices dissenting on the ground that the
lack of relationship between the classes taxed and the duty to support the aged poor
made the classification arbitrary and discriminatory.2
Had the legislature imposed the additional inheritance tax, and in a separate act
appropriated money from the general fund for the payment of the old age pensions,
the only substantial question that could arise would be as to the validity of the
expenditure. For the state could impose an additional tax upon the privilege of in-
heriting property, since the amount of the tax exacted as a condition of exercise
of the privilege is wholly a matter of legislative discretion.3 And although, if the
taxes in the instant case were direct taxes, they would contravene the constitutional
requirement that all taxes shall be uniform, 4 the objection is not well taken as respects
excise or privilege taxes, which need only be uniform in application to the same class
of subjects.5 But the fact that in the instant case both the tax and appropriation
of the proceeds thereof were incorporated in the same statute had at least two
important consequences. First, although a state taxpayer, unlike a federal taxpayer,0
generally may enjoin the expenditure of state funds for a non-public purpose even
when the tax and the appropriation are not linked,7 nevertheless, he does not relieve
himself of the duty of paying the tax except when the tax and appropriation are so
linked that invalidation of the appropriation invalidates the tax.8 Thus, the fact
1. Colo. Laws 1933, c. 145, p. 764.
2. In re Hunter's Estate, 49 P. (2d) 1009 (Colo. 1935).
3. Magoun v. Illinois Trust & Say. Bank, 170 U. S. 283 (1898); Brown v. Elder, 32
Colo. 527, 77 Pac. 853 (1904); 4 CooLEY, T.xAIzoz, (4th ed. 1924) § 1725.
4. CoL~o. CONST. art. X, § 3.
5. And the cla-ification must be reasonable. Standard Oil Co. v. Brodie, 153 Ark. 114,
239 S. W. 753 (1922) (motor fuel tax); Altitude Oil Co. v. People, 70 Colo. 452, 202
Pac. 180 (1921), writ of error dismissed, 260 U. S. 693 (1922) (motor fuel tax); Van
Dyke v. Wisconsin Tax Comm., 217 Wis. 528, 259 N. W. 700 (1935) (income tax); fee
1 COOL-Y, TAXATIoN §§ 156, 267, 269.
6. Without such linking of tax and appropriation a federal taxpayer is not deemed to
have suffident interest in federal funds to protest against their expenditure for an uncon-
stitutional use. Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U. S. 447 (1923). But when the taxpayer
can show that the revenue is to be used for an unconstitutional purpose, he has standing
to contest the validity of the tax. United States v. Butler, U. S. L. Week, Jan. 7, 1936, at 373.
7. Green v. Frazier, 253 U. S. 233 (1920); Leckenby v. Post Printing & Publishing Co,
65 Colo. 443, 176 Pac. 490 (1918); Greenfield v. Russel, 292 11. 392, 127 N. E. 102 (1920);
Fischer v. Marsh, 113 Neb. 153, 202 N. W. 422 (1925); White Eagle 0. & P. Co. v. Gunder-
son, 48 S. D. 608, 205 N. W. 614 (1925). Contra: Asplund v. Harnett, 31 N. M. 641,
249 Pac. 1074 (1926). See Note L. R. A. 1915 D 178.
8. As in State ex rl. Garth v. Switzler, 143 Mlo. 287, 45 S. W. 245 (1898).
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that the tax and appropriation were incorporated in the same statute in the instant
case made it possible for the protesting taxpayer to avoid payment of the tax if he
could have the appropriation held invalid, although the tax might by itself be valid.
Another consequence of the coupling of the tax and appropriation in the same
statute, and consequent facilitation of the tracing of the tax proceeds to their ultimate
expenditure, is that the protesting taxpayer, in addition to the argument available to
any taxpayer to the effect that the expenditure of the tax proceeds is invalid as not
being for a public purpose,9 may claim a denial of the equal protection of the laws
in that the tax arbitrarily taxes one class of persons, that is, the class to which the
protesting taxpayer belongs, for the benefit of another. Thus, while expenditure for
the relief of aged indigents might be held to be for a public purpose, defeating any
attack on the law brought by a general taxpayer, on the other hand, a taxpayer
belonging to the special class taxed for the purpose of making possible the expenditure
has available the additional argument that there is a lack of reasonable connection
between the burden placed upon his class and the benefits derived from the tax
proceeds, or, perhaps, the duty to confer such benefits. The tax in the instant case,
however, being an excise or privilege tax, could not easily be overthrown on that
ground. For, where such a tax is levied for a special purpose, the courts ordinarily
will not go beyond the determination of whether the purpose is public.10 If the
tax is levied for a public purpose, it is immaterial that the taxed class is not primarily
obligated morally to sustain the burden of the expenditure, or that it does not receive
the primary benefits from the expenditure or that others not subject to the tax ate
benefited.11 Indeed, it is difficult to conceive of a public expenditure which would
redound solely or principally to the benefit of the class paying inheritance taxes or
which that class would be primarily obligated to pay for. Thus, if it be conceded
9. No requirement that it must be for a public purpose appears in the Colorado con-
stitution; but the requirement is invariably enforced, even without constitutional provision,
as a limitation on legislative power growing out of "the essential nature of all free govern-
ments." See Loan Ass'n v. Topeka, 20 Wall. 655, 663 (U. S. 1874). Furthermore, taxation
for a non-public purpose is a deprivation of property without due process of law In
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. See Fallbrook
Irr. Dist. v. Bradley, 164 U. S. 112, 158 (1896) ; Green v. Frazier, 253 U. S. 233, 238 (1920).
But, since the determination of what is a public purpose depends largely upon local con-
ditions, the United States Supreme Court, when confronted with such cases, gives great
weight to the determinations of state legislatures and courts. See Fallbrook Irr. Dist. v.
Bradley, supra, at 160; Green v. Frazier, supra, at 239; Milhein v. Moffat Tunnel Imp.
Dist., 262 U. S. 710, 717 (1923).
10. Milis v. State Board of Equalization, 97 Mont. 13, 33 P. (2d) 563 (1934) (tax on
incomes for unemployment relief); State ex rel. Hamilton v. Martin, 173 Wash. 249, 23
P. (2d) 1 (1933) (proceeds of motor fuel tax applied to retirement of bonds Issued for
unemployment relief); Van Dyke v. Wisconsin Tax Comm., 217 Wis. 528, 259 N. W. 700
(1935) (tax on incomes for unemployment relief).
11. Phoenix Assur. Co. v. Fire Dep't, 117 Ala. 631, 23 So. 843 (1898) (tax on fire
insurance companies for firemen's pension fund); Cobbs v. Home Ins. Co., 18 Ala. App, 206,
91 So. 627 (1921), cert. denied sub. nom. Ex parte Home Ins. Co., 207 Ala. 712, 91 So,
922 (1921) (same); State v. Wilson & Co., 179 La. 648, 154 So. 636 (1934), appeal dis-
missed, Wilson & Co. v. Louisiana, 293 U. S. 518 (1934) (tax on meat businesM for eradication
of cattle fever tick); see 1 Coor.=-Y, TAxATIO- § 89, p. 214. Contra: Lowry v. City of
Ciarksdale, 154 Miss. 155, 122 So. 195 (1929) (tax on fire insurance premiums for firemen's
pension fund held invalid on ground that fire department protects all property, insured
and uninsured); cf. State v. Lafayette Fire Ins. Co., 134 La. 78, 63 So. 630 (1913) (those
liable for invalidated tax could receive no benefit from the expenditure).
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in the instant case that the payment of the old age pensions is for a public purpose,
the classes taxed for that payment are among those benefited, and the tax would seem
sustainable, regardless of the fact that there is no particular relationship between
persons who inherit property and the duty or benefits of support of the aged poor.
That payment of old age pensions is for a public purpose seems to be a reasonable
conclusion. For, although a statute which would make age the sole criterion for
determining the recipients of pensions might be held invalid as providing for the
expenditure of public funds for a private purpose,12 on the other hand, pensions
limited to persons who are needy as well as aged may well be upheld,' 3 relief of
the poor having long been regarded as a public function.
1 4
Finally, unable to prove that the tax considered by itself is invalid, or that he is
denied equal protection of the laws by reason of the lack of connection between the
burden of the tax and the duty or primary benefits of support of the aged, or that
the statute is invalid by reason of the appropriation being for a private rather than
a public purpose, the taxpayer might seek to have the appropriation, and consequently
the tax coupled with it in the same statute, held invalid as being for a county rather
than a state purpose, and therefore in violation of the state constitution.25 But
the definition of "county purpose" depends largely upon past practice in the state,
and while the Colorado Supreme Court has held that poor relief is a county matter
for which the state may not levy taxes,16 nevertheless, the payment of old age pensions
has not been placed in the past in that category. Thus, there seems to be no reason
to refuse to accept the legislative declaration that the expenditure is for a state purpose,
especially since the state retains control of the disposition of the funds.
CONTINGENT FEE CONTRACT TO PRocLuE LEGISLATION
PROPERTY worth $10,000,000 belonging to a non-resident German corporation vwas
seized in 1917 by the Alien Property Custodian under the Trading with the Enemy
Act.' Since in 1922 Congress had not yet made any provision for the return of such
12. See In re Opinion of the Justices, 85 N. H. 562, 563, 154 At. 217, 221 (1931).
13. In re Opinion of the justices, 85 N. H. 562, 154 AUt. 217 (1931). The mere fact
that the money goes to individuals will not condemn the e.xpenditure, for the test is not
who receives the money but whether the purpose for which it is expended is public in
nature. See Stanley v. Jeffries, 86 Mont. 114, 129, 284 Pac. 134, 138 (1929). Mothers'
pension acts, providing for the payment to indigent mothers of money for the support
of dependent minor children, have been upheld. State ex rel. Steams County v. Klasen, 123
Minn. 382, 143 N. W. 984 (1913) ; Cass County v. Nixon, 35 N. D. 601, 161 N. W. 204 (1917).
14. Kely v. Pittsburgh, 104 U. S. 78 (1881); Rummens v. Evans, 168 Wash. 527, 13 P.
(2d) 26 (1932); State ex rel. Hamilton v. Martin, 173 Wash. 249, 23 P. (2d) 1 (1933);
Van Dyke v. Wisconsin Tax Commission, 217 Wis. 528, 259 N. W. 700 (1935); see 1
Coo=xv, T&-AnON § 215.
15. CoLO. CoxsT. art. X, § 7.
16. Walker v. Bedford, 93 Colo. 400, 26 P. (2d) 1051 (1933); cf. State ex rel. Pierce
v. Gowdy, 62 Mont. 119, 203 Pac. 1115 (1922) (constitutional provision that countie3 shall
care for poor). But cf. Mills v. State Board of Equalization, 97 Mont. 13, 33 P. (2d) 563
(1934), holding that the constitutional provision requiring counties to support the poor
did not prevent the state from assisting through the creation of a state emergency relief
find, provided by state taxation.
1. 40 STAr. 411 (1917). This Act established the office of the Alien Property Custo-
dian, who was empowered to receive and to hold as a common law trustee all property
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property,2 defendant corporation employed plaintiff on a contingent fee contract as
its attorney, authorizing him to take such steps as he might deem necessary or advis-
able for recovery of the property. The contract further provided that defendant
could terminate the employment at any time upon the payment of a reasonable fee
for the services rendered to the date of termination. Under this contract, plaintiff
sought and helped to secure the passage by Congress in 1928 of the Settlement of
War Claims Act, which established a tribunal before which defendant's claim could
be prosecuted.3 Thereupon, defendant terminated plaintiff's employment and refused
to pay him. Shortly thereafter, defendant established before this tribunal a claim
for $5,000,000. Plaintiff sued for a reasonable fee as provided in the contract, and
was allowed $250,000 by the trial court. On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia reversed on the ground that, since this was a contingent fee
contract for the procurement of general remedial legislation, the contract was void
as against public policy.
4
While under a democratic system of government interested citizens should be
encouraged to suggest and promote legislation desired by them, thus enabling the
legislature to respond more nearly to popular opinion, as well as to avail itself of
the knowledge and experience to be gained by hearing conflicting views, yet, a counter-
balancing consideration is the public interest in keeping legislative processes free from
corruption and prejudice. Thus, if it is proved that an agent of proponents of legis-
lation has improperly influenced legislators pursuant to a contract with his principals,
the contract is uniformly held to be unenforceable, regardless of the provisions on
its face.5 Moreover, any contract which on its face requires improper practices,
such as secret solicitation of individual legislators, is unenforceable, even though it
cannot be proved that illegal practices actually occurred.0 Yet it has uniformly been
held that any person interested in proposed legislation may employ an agent on a
straight fee contract to draft a bill or to explain it to any committee or to argue
located in the United States which belonged to an "enemy", within the meaning of the Act.
The President was given power to order that "enemy" property be paid to the Custodian.
During the war, more than $500,000,000 of property was seized. See (1926) 5 CoNo. Dio. 335.
2. However, it was generally expected that Congress would at some time return the
property seized. The Trading With the Enemy Act provided that ". . .after the end of
the war any claim of any enemy ... to any money or other property received and held by
the alien property custodian ... shall be settled as Congress shall direct." 40 STAT. 424 (1917).
Also, it seems that it has generally been the practice of the United States government to
make provision for the return of such property to its former owners. See How America
Has Dealt With War Claims of the Past (1926) 5 CONG. Dio. 331.
3. 45 STAT. 254 (1928). Extended hearings were had and several bills were proposed
before this Act was finally passed. See Hearings before Subcommittee of the Committee on
Ways and Means on H-R. 10820, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. (1926).
4. Gesellschaft fUr Drahtlose Telegraphie M.BM-. v. Brown, 78 F. (2d) 410 (App. D. C.
1935), cert. denied, 56 Sup. Ct. 169 (1935).
5. Adams v. East Boston Co., 236 Mass. 121, 127 N. E. 628 (1920); see I CooLEv, Cox-
sTrrTuioNAL Lu ATrAoNs (8th ed. 1927) 284; Comment (1930) 78 U. or PA. L. REV. 401,
404; cf. Burke v. Wood, 162 Fed. 533 (C. C. S. D. Ala. 1908); Houlton v. Dunn, 60 Minn.
26, 61 N. W. 898 (1895).
6. Rose and Hawley v. Truax, 21 Barb. 361 (Sup. Ct. N. Y. 1855); see RESTATEMENT,
CoNTRAcTs (1932) § 559; Comment (1930) 14 MiNN. L. REv. 163; (1924) 29 A. L. R. 157,
158; cf. Marshall v. Baltimore & Ohio Rr., 16 How. 314 (U. S. 1853); Goodrich v. North-
western Tel. Ex. Co., 161 Minn. 106, 201 N. W. 290 (1924).
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publicly for its passage, and that the contract is enforceable unless it is proved that
illegal means were used.
7
When contracts of this sort, however, provide that payment is to be contingent
upon success before the legislature, some courts have refused to enforce them even
though no proof of illegal acts is offered,8 apparently believing that such contracts
would tend generally to promote corrupt practices and should therefore be uniformly
held invalid, even though in particular instances they might be shown not to have
resulted in undesirable conduct. Since such a prophylactic rule is an obvious restraint
upon freedom of contract, it is justified only if it does actually protect legislative
integrity. Where persons hire agents to use illegal practices in influencing legislation,
it is arguable that a contingent fee contract might exert some pressure on the agents
to go farther in the use of this illegal influence than would a straight fee contract.
Though the invalidation of all contingent fee contracts would perhaps eliminate this
additional element of pressure toward use of illegal methods, nevertheless, the fact
that the agent in these cases was hired for the very purpose of using illegal practices
to influence legislation indicates that the gain thus achieved by the rule would be
limited to reducing the grossness of the illegalities rather than their existence-cer-
tainly a dubious reason to justify a refusal to enforce all such contingent fee contracts,
whether bona fide or not. The only other situation in which the contingency of the
reward would promote corrupt practices is that in which an agent, who at the time
the contract of employment was made had no intention of using illegal methods, was
induced to turn to improper practices during the performance of the contract because
of the inducement of the contingency of the reward. Since, however, most tampering
with legislative bodies by independent agents probably results from carefully planned
illegal agreements, it seems unlikely that the single influence of a contingent fee upon
one who intended to use only legal methods causes much improper activity. But even
though this rule might prevent an occasional illegal practice, more frequently its only
result may be to prevent the man who is financially unable to pay a straight fee from
having access to the legislative chamber. And even more frequently, its only result
may be unjustly to enrich the employer who profits from his agent's efforts yet refuses
to reward him. Consequently, it seems wiser to abandon any attempt to regulate
future conduct by the invalidation of contingent fee contracts and to confine judicial
attention to the merits of the particular case. Many courts, recognizing this, have
adopted the more liberal rule that, though a contingent fee contract to procure legis-
lation gives notice of possible illegality and hence a careful scrutiny of the acts of
the parties is required, the contract is enforceable if it appears that improper action
was not contemplated and did not occur.
7. Kemble v. Weaver, 200 Iowa 1333, 206 N. W. 83 (1925); West v. Coos County, 115
Ore. 409, 237 Pac. 961 (1925); see 3 WmLismoN, Coh.Nmcrs (1920) § 1728; d. Steele v.
Drummond, 275 U. S. 199 (1927); Miles v. Thome, 38 Cal. 335 (1869); Cole v. Brown-
Hurley Hardware, 139 Iowa 487, 117 N. W. 746 (1903); Houlton v. Nichol, 93 Wis. 393,
67 N. W. 715 (1896).
8. Marshall v. Baltimore & Ohio Rr., 16 How. 314 (U. S. 1853); Trist v. Child, 21
Wall. 441 (U. S. 1874); Hazelton v. Sheckells, 202 U. S. 71 (1906); Noonan v. Gilbert, 68
F. (2d) 775 (App. D. C. 1934), noted and criticized (1934) 14 B. U. L. REv. 834; Coquil-
lard's Adm'r v. Bearss, 21 Ind. 479 (1863); Richardson v. Scott's Bluff County, 59 Neb. 400,
81 N. W. 309 (1899); Clippinger v. Hepbaugh, 5 Watts & S. 315 (Sup. Ct. Pa. 1843); Chip-
pewa Valley & S. Ry. Co. v. Chicago, St. P., M. & 0. Ry. Co., 75 W'is. 224, 44 N. W. 17
(1889); see (1922) 7 CoRN. L. Q. 361.
9. Stanton v. Embrey, 93 U. S. 548 (1876); Nutt v. Knut, 200 U. S. 12 (1906); WInton
v. Amos, 255 U. S. 373 (1921); Hunt v. Test, 8 Ala. 713 (1845); Denison v. Crawford
County, 48 Iowa 211 (1878) ; Parkey v. Brock, 222 Ky. 34, 299 S. W. 1061 (1927) ; Stroemer
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The court in the principal case, recognizing this latter rule, avoided its application
by holding that, though the rule applied to contracts concerning individual debt or
contract claims requiring legislation and appropriation by the government, it was
not applicable when the contract, as here, contemplated the securing of general remedial
legislation. No reason was 'given for this distinction other than that, in passing the
former type of legislation, a legislature acts in a "quasi-judicial" capacity, while in
passing the Settlement of War Claims Act, for example, Congress was acting purely
in a "legislative" capacity. Since legislation of general importance, that is, so-called
remedial legislation, directly affects many more people than does a bill concerning a
private claim, attempts to influence the legislative body are perhaps more likely to
occur in the former instance. Yet the very importance of such legislation would tend
to make the legislators less susceptible to illicit dealings than when an unimportant
claim is at issue.' 0 Also, since it is impossible to draw accurately this distinction
between "quasi-judicial" and "legislative" activity of a legislative body, lawyers could
not know whether their'contingent fee contracts were valid or invalid until a court
in each situation had classified the particular activity of the legislature with which
the contract was concerned. Thus, in the instant case, one might easily have sup-
posed that the legislation sought, which was to facilitate the recovery of war claims,
concerned the recognition of private claims, and could not be regarded as general
remedial legislation. Finally, since the sole purpose of the rules invalidating cer-
tain of these contracts is to foster unbiased action by the legislature, the rules would
seem equally pertinent or irrelevant, as the case may be, to both "legislative" and
"quasi-judicial" activity. It would seem, therefore, that the same basic considera-
tions which would prompt the court rendering the instant decision to uphold contin-
kent fee contracts as to private claim legislation, where no illegal intentions or acts
are shown, should have prompted it to validate such contracts as to so-called remedial
legislation and thus to permit plaintiff's recovery in the instant case.
POWER OF BANKRUPTCY COURT TO REVISE TAX CLAIMS
A BANKRUPT was delinquent in payment of county and municipal real property taxes.
The taxes had been assessed in the proper manner and the time for review had passed;
the claims were therefore incontestable under state law at the time the petition in
bankruptcy was filed. Nevertheless, the trustee in bankruptcy petitioned the court,
on the ground that the land had been assessed at more than its real value, to revise
and reduce the claims under Section 64a of the Bankruptcy Act, which provides that
the bankruptcy court shall order the trustee of a bankrupt to pay all tax claims
legally due and pwing by the bankrupt, and that in case of dispute the court shall
have jurisdiction of all questions as to the amount and legality of the tax.' But
the court held that, since the claims were for taxes legally due and owing, the
v. Van Orsdel, 74 Neb. 132, 103 N. W. 1053 (1905), 107 N. W. 125 (1906); Chesebrough
v. Conover, 140 N. Y. 382, 35 N. E. 633 (1893); Herrick v. Barzee, 96 Ore. 357, 190 Pac.
141 (1920); Stansell v. Roach, 147 Tenn. 183, 246 S. W. 520 (1923); State v. Okanogan
County, 153 Wash. 399, 280 Pac. 31 (1929); see (1932) 26 ILL. L. Rv. 584; cf. Spalding
v. Mason, 161 U. S. 375 (1896); McGowan v. Parish, 237 U. S. 285 (1915).
Of course, if illegal practices occurred, the contract would not be enforced. Brown v,
Brown, 34 Barb. 533 (Sup. Ct. N. Y. 1861).
10. See Trist v. Child, 21 Wall. 441, 451 (U. S. 1874); Clippinger v. Hepbaugh, 5 Watts
& S. 315, 319 (Sup. Ct. Pa. 1843).
1. 44 STAT. 666, 11 U. S. C. A. § 104(a) (1926).
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bankruptcy court had no power to revise the assessment. 2 And since the ground
for the holding was that the questions as to amount or legality referred to in Section
64a are limited to those which could be raised in state judicial proceedings, the
bankruptcy court seemingly could not review the assessment even if the time for
administrative review under state law has not expired.
Ordinarily, judicial review of tax levies and assessments is narrowly limited. Where
a tax is constitutional and the property is within the jurisdiction for taxing purposes,
the only basis for defeating the claim in court, without first pursuing administrative
remedies, is that the assessment was not made in accordance with the procedure
prescribed by statute. The only available method for having the assessment reised
is by appeal to an administrative board, from which an appeal may be taken to a
court on matters of law.3 In addition to the consideration of the unnecessary expense
and interference with collection of taxes that would result if the question of value
could be litigated by every taxpayer, a certain amount of administrative finality is
desirable so that uniformity may be approached and the tax burden equitably
distributed.4
But it is argued in favor of review of assessments by the bankruptcy court, where
the taxpayer had gone into bankruptcy after the time for review had passed, that a
bankrupt might, while on the verge of insolvency, allow excessive assessments to be
made without seeking proper review or might even file padded reports of assets and
earnings to avoid the appearance of actual or imminent insolvency. If the bankruptcy
court could not review assessments so determined, the creditors would be deprived
of their fair share of the bankrupt's assets.
This argument might be well taken if anything could be found to indicate that
tax obligations were to be determined by the bankruptcy court only with reference
to the debtor's ability to pay or with regard to the equities of the creditors. But
since the evident purpose of Section 64a is to give priority to tax claims, it seems
reasonable to conclude that liability for taxes was to remain unchanged in bankruptcy.
The proper test, then, of whether a tax is "legally due and owing" would be whether
it could be collected legally if bankruptcy had not intervened. Thus, a claim which
had become incontestable under the law of the taxing sovereign, as had those in the
instant case, would not be subject to revision by the bankruptcy court, even though
it were shown that the bankrupt had negligently failed to seek proper review or had
padded his tax returns.6 Under this interpretation the "questions as to the amount
and legality of the tax" which the bankruptcy court would have jurisdiction to
2. In re Gould Mfg. Co., 11 F. Supp. 644 (E. D. Wis. 1935).
3. See 3 Coorxv, TAATioN (4th ed. 1924) §§ 1194, 1200; 4 id. § 1612.
4. Cf. Sioux City Bridge Co. v. Dakota County, 260 U. S. 441 (1923); Sloman-Polk
Co. v. City of Detroit, 261 Mich. 689, 247 N. W. 95 (1933); 1 Coo=ur, op. cit. supra
note 3, § 295.
5. Cf. In re Fisher Corp., 229 Fed. 316 (D. Mass. 1915).
6. The language in several cases seems to indicate that the bankruptcy court has un-
limited power to disregard administrative findings of fact and to determine on the evidence
before it what amount is due under the substantive provisions of the tax law. In re
Fisher Corp., 229 Fed. 316 (D. Mass. 1915) ; In re Simcox, 243 Fed. 479 (S. D. N. Y. 1917) ;
Henderson County v. Wlkins, 43 F. (2d) 670 (C. C. A. 4th, 1930); see In re Heffron Co.,
216 Fed. 642, 650 (N. D. N. Y. 1914); In re United Five & Ten Cent Store, Inc., 242 Fed.
1005, 1006 (S. D. N. Y. 1917); cf. In re George F. Redmond & Co., Inc., 17 F. (2d) 128
(D. Mass. 1927). But only in the first of these cases does the court dearly intimate that
it is not limited to questions which the bankrupt could raise.
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determine would be limited to whether the amount claimed was "legally due and
owing" under the law of the taxing jurisdiction.
7
The further problem arises, when review by an administrative board is still open
at the time of the filing of the petition in bankruptcy, whether the power of the
bankruptcy court should be held coextensive with that of the administrative board
to review assessments. In favor of such a power is the fact that the bankruptcy
court may be in the better position to determine the value of the property.8  Yet,
since uniformity rather than accuracy in valuation is the goal of the provisions for
revision of assessments, it would seem undesirable for the court to review the ques-
tion of valuation, which ordinarily is determinable solely by the administrative
authority. And the purpose of conferring jurisdiction on the bankruptcy court, viz.,
to avoid the delay and expense of ordinary litigation,9 would probably not be defeated
by requiring the trustee to teek revision before the administrative board. Since,
however, the proper solution of the problem, both as a matter of interpretation
and of policy, is uncertain, the court's language in the instant case indicating that
power is completely lacking in the bankruptcy courts to review assessments or reassess
taxes should not be considered to establish that proposition when the question is
squarely presented in the future.
7. The further determination of whether the claim is a tax claim, and therefore entitled
to priority under the Bankruptcy Act, is also essential. And this is a question to be
determined independently by the bankruptcy court as an interpretation of the Act. New
Jersey v. Anderson, 203 U. S. 483 (1906).
8. In addition to the cases cited in note 6, supra, the following cases seem to indicate
the existence of such a power: New Jersey v. Anderson, 203 U. S. 483 (1906) ; In re
W. P. Williams Oil Corp., 265 Fed. 401 (W. D. Ky. 1920); In re General Film Corp., 274
Fed. 903 (C. C. A. 2d, 1921); In re Sheinman, 14 F. (2d) 323 (E. D. Pa. 1926); In ro
Bradley, 16 F. (2d) 301 (S. D. N. Y. 1926). But it does not appear clearly in any of
these cases that judicial rather than administrative review was not available apart from
bankruptcy.
9. Cf. In re W. P. Williams Oil Corp. and In re Sheinman, both supra note 8.
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